Presidential Papers, Doc#816 Cable. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 4 April 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Presidential Papers, Doc#816 Cable. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 4 April 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

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Doc #817

Document #816; April 4, 1954
To Winston Spencer Churchill
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Churchill ; Category: Cable. Top secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part V: Maintaining "a united defense"; April 1954 to August 1954
Chapter 10: Losing the war "they could not win"

Dear Winston:¹ I am sure that like me you are following with the deepest interest and anxiety the daily reports of the gallant fight being put up by the French at Dien Bien Phu. Today, the situation there does not seem hopeless.²
But regardless of the outcome of this particular battle, I fear that the French cannot alone see the thing through, this despite the very substantial assistance in money and materiel that we are giving them.³ It is no solution simply to urge the French to intensify their efforts, and if they do not see it through, and Indochina passes into the hands of the Communists, the ultimate effect on our and your global strategic position with the consequent shift in the power ratio throughout Asia and the Pacific could be disastrous and, I know, unacceptable to you and me.⁴ It is difficult to see how Thailand, Burma and Indonesia could be kept out of Communist hands. This we cannot afford. The threat to Malaya, Australia and New Zealand would be direct. The offshore island chain would be broken. The economic pressures on Japan which would be deprived of non-Communist markets and sources of food and raw materials would be such, over a period of time, that it is difficult to see how Japan could be prevented from reaching an accommodation with the Communist world which would combine the manpower and natural resources of Asia with the industrial potential of Japan.⁵ This has led us to the hard conclusion that the situation in Southeast Asia requires us urgently to take serious and far-reaching decisions.
Geneva is less than four weeks away.⁶ There the possibility of the Communists driving a wedge between us will, given the state of mind in France, be infinitely greater than at Berlin.⁷ I can understand the very natural desire of the French to seek an end to this war which has been bleeding them for eight years. But our painstaking search for a way out of the impasse has reluctantly forced us to the conclusion that there is no negotiated solution of the Indochina problem which in its essence would not be either a face-saving device to cover a French surrender or a face-saving device to cover a Communist retirement. The first alternative is too serious in this broad strategic implications for us and for you to be acceptable. Apart from its effects in Southeast Asia itself, where you and the Commonwealth have direct and vital interests, it would have the most serious repercussions in North Africa, in Europe and elsewhere. Here at home it would cause a widespread loss of confidence in the cooperative system. I think it is not too much to say that the future of France as a great power would be fatally affected. Perhaps France will never again be the great power it was, but a sudden vacuum wherever French power is, would be difficult for us to cope with.
Somehow we must contrive to bring about the second alternative. The preliminary lines of our thinking were sketched out by Foster in his speech last Monday night when he said that under the conditions of today the imposition on Southeast Asia of the political system of Communist Russia and its Chinese Communist ally, by whatever means, would be a grave threat to the whole free community, and that in our view this possibililty should now be met by united action and not passively accepted.⁸ He has also talked intimately with Roger Makins.⁹
I believe that the best way to put teeth in this concept and to bring greater moral and material resources to the support of the French effort is through the establishment of a new, ad hoc grouping or coalition of nations which have a vital concern in the checking of Communist expansion in the area. I have in mind in addition to our two countries, France, the Associated States, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and the Philippines. The United States Government would expect to play its full part in such a coalition. The coalition we have in mind would not be directed against Communist China. But if, contrary to our belief, our efforts to save Indochina and the British Commonwealth position to the south should in any way increase the jeopardy to Hong Kong, we would expect to be with you there.¹⁰ I support that the United Nations should somewhere be recognized, but I am not confident that, given the Soviet veto, it could act with needed speed and vigor.
I would contemplate no role for Formosa or the Republic of Korea in the political construction of this coalition.¹¹
The important thing is that the coalition must be strong and it must be willing to join the fight if necessary. I do not envisage the need of any appreciable ground forces on your or our part. If the members of the alliance are sufficiently resolute it should be able to make clear to the Chinese Communists that the continuation of their material support to the Viet Minh will inevitably lead to the growing power of the forces arrayed against them.
My colleagues and I are deeply aware of the risks which this proposal may involve but in the situation which confronts us there is no course of action or inaction devoid of dangers and I know no man who has firmly grasped more nettles than you. If we grasp this one together I believe that we will enormously increase our chances of bringing the Chinese to believe that their interests lie in the direction of a discreet disengagement. In such a contingency we could approach the Geneva conference with the position of the free world not only unimpaired but strengthened.
Today we face the hard situation of contemplating a disaster brought on by French weakness and the necessity of dealing with it before it develops. This means frank talk with the French. In many ways the situation corresponds to that which you describe so brilliantly in the second chapter of "Their Finest Hour", when history made clear that the French strategy and dispositions before the 1940 breakthrough should have been challenged before the blow fell.¹²
I regret adding to your problems. But in fact it is not I, but our enemies who add to them. I have faith that by another act of fellowship in the face of peril we shall find a spiritual vigor which will prevent our slipping into the quagmire of distrust.
If I may refer again to history, we failed to halt Hirohito, Mussolini and Hitler by not acting in unity and in time.¹³ That marked the beginning of many years of stark tragedy and desperate peril. May it not be that our nations have learned something from that lesson?
So profoundly do I believe that the effectiveness of the coalition principle is at stake that I am prepared to send Foster or Bedell to visit you this week, at the earliest date convenient to you. Whoever comes would spend a day in Paris to avoid French pique, the cover would be preparation for Geneva.¹⁴ With warm regard

¹ Eisenhower, Dulles, and State Department Counselor Douglas MacArthur II jointly drafted this message at the presidential retreat at Camp David on April 3 (see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, p. 1238).
² The French position at Dien Bien Phu--where the battle had remained relatively calm for almost two weeks--had deteriorated rapidly after March 30 when the Vietminh had captured several positions surrounding the main French headquarters (for background see no. 784). French counterattacks were in large part unsuccessful, and resupply, now limited to parachute drops, was becoming increasingly difficult as the garrison's perimeter shrank. On April 2 the American ambassador to Vietnam reported that at the current rates of fire the French garrison would quickly run out of ammunition. On the night of April 3-4, however, the French successfully reinforced Dien Bien Phu with 305 paratroopers (Davidson, Vietnam at War, pp. 240-55; Fall, Hell in a Very Small Place, pp. 169-218; and State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1190-91, 1209-10).
³ See no. 352 for background on the American assistance program. During the latter part of March and early April the Eisenhower Administration had been trying to decide how to deal with the developing crisis in Indochina. On March 20 General Paul Ely, Chief of Staff of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff, had arrived in Washington to ask for more military aid to combat the Vietminh and to prepare for the possibility of Communist Chinese intervention. Dulles had informed Ely that American "open participation" in the war might be predicated on "a greater degree of partnership than had prevailed up to the present time." Other preconditions included the granting of complete independence to the French territories in Indochina and an expanded role for the United States in training the Vietnamese (Dulles to Eisenhower, Mar. 23, 1954, AWF/D-H; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1158-59).
In a discussion of this meeting with Dulles, Eisenhower agreed that the United States "should not get involved in fighting in Indochina unless there were the political pre-conditions necessary for a successful outcome." The President admitted, however, that he might authorize a single strike against the Vietminh if such a strike "would produce decisive results"; he agreed with the Secretary of State that it might be more profitable to "slow up the Chinese Communists in Southeast Asia by harassing tactics from Formosa and along the seacoast" (Dulles, Memorandum of Conversation, Mar. 24, 1954, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series). At the April 1 NSC meeting Eisenhower continued to consider the possibility of taking emergency action to save Dien Bien Phu. He noted that all the members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff except Admiral Radford were opposed to an immediate American air strike (although the Chief of Staff of the Air Force favored the action if the French would agree to fight the war under American terms) (NSC meeting minutes, Apr. 2, 1954, AWF/NSC; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1198-99, 1220-23).
⁴ Attempting to secure congressional support for whatever course of action the United States might ultimately choose, Dulles, together with Radford and Smith, met with a few influential legislative leaders on April 3. At that meeting the legislators voiced their strong opposition to any unilateral American military measures to prop up the crumbling French position. There was unanimous opposition to the prospect of another situation resembling the Korean War, where, it was felt, the United States had furnished 90 percent of the manpower. The meeting concluded with a decision that Dulles should attempt to secure firm commitments from the British and other interested parties before the Congress would authorize by resolution the use of American forces in the area (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1224-25; Dulles, Memorandum of Conversation, Apr. 2, 1954, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda Series; and George C. Herring and Richard H. Immerman, "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Dienbienphu: `The Day We Didn't Go to War' Revisited," Journal of American History 71, no. 2 [1984], 343-54). Dulles, who had seen the British ambassador on April 2, then suggested to Eisenhower that he should write Churchill to win the necessary British support. Eisenhower agreed and told Dulles to start drafting a cable "on a personal basis to be sure he [Churchill] sees it" (Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, Apr. 3, 1954, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations; State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1214-17).
⁵ On the Australian reluctance to participate in joint military activities against the Vietminh see Gregory James Pemberton, "Australia, the United States, and the Indochina Crisis of 1954," Diplomatic History 13, no. 1 (1989), 45-66. On the potential economic relationship between Japan and Indochina as seen by makers of American foreign policy see State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, p. 1275; Gardner, Approaching Vietnam, pp. 108-14; Michael Schaller, "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," Journal of American History 69, no. 2 (1982), 392-414; and Robert J. McMahon, "The Cold War in Asia: Toward a New Synthesis?" Diplomatic History 12, no. 3 (1988), 320-23.
⁶ The Geneva Conference would begin on April 26; the Indochina phase of the conference would start on May 8. For background see nos. 722 and 784; for developments see no. 854.
⁷ On the Berlin Conference see nos. 719 and 722. Eisenhower was referring to the differences between the United States and France over the question of discussing the Indochina war with the Communist Chinese in attendance at the forthcoming Geneva Conference. See Immerman, "The United States and the Geneva Conference," pp. 48-50.
⁸ See State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1181-82 for background on Dulles's March 29 speech, "The Threat of a Red Asia," to the Overseas Press Club of America. In his call for united action Dulles said that the Communist Chinese and the Soviets would dominate any nation ostensibly led by the Vietminh and that a Communist victory would lead to further aggression in the area.
⁹ A memorandum of Dulles's conversation with the British ambassador is in ibid., pp. 1214-17. Dulles urged consideration of his plan for united action as a means to intimidate the Communist Chinese into abandoning their "adventures" in Southeast Asia. Permitting the Communists to overrun the area could result in greater dangers in the future, when the United States might have less superiority in atomic weapons. Makins replied that the British shared the American concerns but had been unable to formulate any satisfactory solution. He suggested that partitioning Viet Nam might give the noncommunist forces a breathing spell that would allow them to consolidate. Makins added that the British had not given any consideration to military participation, either with the French or as a member of a larger coalition.
¹⁰ See no. 848 for Eisenhower's views on the connection between the British colony of Hong Kong and the situation in Indochina.
¹¹ At a meeting of the NSC on March 25 Eisenhower had proposed excluding Japan and Korea from the proposed coalition because of the "hostility which exists between so many of the Asian nations." At that time he had, however, included the Formosa-based Nationalist Chinese as members of the group (NSC meeting minutes, Mar. 26, 1954, AWF/NSC).
¹² See Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 vols. (Boston, 1948-53), vol. II, Their Finest Hour (1949), pp. 34-38, 47. In the fall of 1939 British military leaders had been worried about a gap in the allied defenses from the Maginot Line fortifications in the south to the British Army units in the north. The British, however, had deferred to the judgment of French leaders in matters involving land combat, just as the French had conformed to British Admiralty plans on the seas. In May 1940 the Germans had poured through the weakest points of the allied lines, defeating the French, Belgian, and British armies in a matter of weeks. Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes suggested the inclusion of this reference to Churchill's memoirs (Telephone conversation, Kyes and Dulles, Apr. 3, 1954, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations).
¹³ Emperor Hirohito of Japan had reigned over his nation during the years leading up to the outbreak of World War II (D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 vols. [Boston, 1970-85], vol. III, Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964 [1985], pp. 105-8, 116).
¹⁴ Churchill would acknowledge Eisenhower's cable in a brief message dated April 6. On the following day he would reply more fully, telling the President that the topic raised "many problems" for the British and that he was sure that Eisenhower would not expect them "to give a hurried decision." He also would invite Dulles to see him in London on April 12 (both cables are in AWF/D). Dulles's subsequent mission (Apr. 10-14) was only partially successful; neither the French nor the British were willing to take definite steps to form a coalition before the negotiations to be held at Geneva. For the details of Dulles's discussions in London and Paris see State, Foreign Relations, 1952 - 1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1307-15, 1319-23, 1327-38; and Billings-Yun, Decision Against War, pp. 123-29. For developments see nos. 839 and 841.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Top secret To Winston Spencer Churchill, 4 April 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 816. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/816.cfm

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