<--PREV Doc #831  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #833 Document #832; April 16, 1954 To Syngman Rhee Series: EM, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series ; Category: Secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way Part V: Maintaining "a united defense"; April 1954 to August 1954 Chapter 10: Losing the war "they could not win"   My dear Mr. President: I have your further letter of April 8 expressing renewed misgivings in regard to the Geneva Conference and requesting increased support of the Korean armed forces.1 I fully appreciate your expression of misgivings in the situation with which we are confronted. I myself am under no illusions as to the difficulties of negotiating and reaching satisfactory settlements with the Communists. Still it is my deep conviction that we should go to Geneva prepared to exhaust every possibility of obtaining the peaceful unification of Korea. That is fully in keeping with the spirit and terms of the Armistice Agreement and our own previous understanding. Therefore, I want to add my own earnest appeal to that of Secretary of State Dulles, most recently expressed in his message of April 7, that you join with us and our other allies at Geneva in a concerted and earnest attempt to attain the peaceful settlement of the Korean problem which we all ardently desire.2 As we had sought all along, Soviet Russia will be at Geneva on the one side flanked by her Chinese Communist and Korean Communist allies. Neither India nor any other neutral nation will attend the Korean Conference.3 If the Republic of Korea participates we shall be there sixteen strong on our side with determination to strive to the best of our abilities to obtain a satisfactory settlement. In addition, I believe that Korea's presence at Geneva would be immeasurably helpful in maintaining the unity of the free world at a time when we are attempting to forge a common front to cope with Communist activities. Once having met at Geneva, should the Communist side stall or act in bad faith, we shall be prepared, pursuant to the understanding reached between you and Secretary Dulles, to consult about what further steps we can properly take to deal with the then existing situation.4 But you must understand that, for the reasons set forth in my letter of March 20, I cannot comply with your requests for United States support in military action to unify Korea.5 With respect to your desire to strengthen the armed forces of the Republic of Korea, I can assure you of my sympathetic understanding. In studying these requests we have had to consider the whole strategic position of the free world, the necessity placed upon us for supplying equipment to help the forces of the French and the Associated States in their struggle against Communist aggression, and the assistance previously furnished to the Republic of Korea. We have also considered the manpower and budgetary requirements for the program of economic rehabilitation upon which we are jointly engaged, as well as the requirements for the defense of your country. After weighing the foregoing factors, we are considering the following program for the continuing improvement of ROK forces with traditional United States assistance: 1. Continued development of the ROK Army to a field army, capable in itself of sustained combat operations. 2. Continued modernization of the ROK Navy and the addition to it of antisubmarine, amphibious and auxiliary-type vessels including two destroyer escorts. 3. Reorganization of the ROK Marine Corps from a brigade of scattered small units to a combat-capable division. 4. Modernization of the ROK Air Force by reequipping the existing fighter wing with jet-type aircraft, and by the establishment of an efficient tactical control organization. Training of ROK pilots for transition to jet aircraft will begin as soon as practicable.6 To this end, I am asking General Van Fleet to go to Korea to consult with you and your military advisers, to study the situation thoroughly, and to develop recommendations in concert with General Hull both as to the future size and composition of the active armed forces of the Republic of Korea and the practicability of a joint United States-Republic of Korea program for Korean reserve forces.7 I am confident that if the United States and the Republic of Korea work in close concert to carry out the strengthening of your defense forces and to push forward the program of economic rehabilitation, we can continue to build the position of strength in Korea which we both realize is essential to your interests, to ours, and to those of the free world as a whole. With personal good wishes and warm regards. Sincerely8 1 "Not knowing what to do at this darkest moment in our fight for survival of Korea," Rhee had written, "I am appealing to you once again by asking you to advise me what can be done" (Enclosed in Briggs to Department of State, Apr. 8, 1954, AWF/D-H). The Department of State drafted this reply (Dulles to Eisenhower, Apr. 8, 1954, ibid.). For background see no. 788. 2 Dulles had acknowledged "the unlikelihood of a result" satisfactory to both the United States and Korea. "On the other hand," he added, "it would, I think, be a great mistake if your Government, by its absence, gave the impression that you were responsible for the failure to bring about peacefully the unification of Korea and its freedom from foreign forces as is the purpose of the Conference" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference, pp. 77-78). 3 Rhee had opposed Indian representation (ibid., pp. 79-80). 4 For the complete text of this "understanding" see U.S. Department of State Bulletin 29, no. 738 (August 17, 1953), 203-4. Satisfied that the United States would abandon discussions if results were not forthcoming, Rhee would agree to attend. "Once our friends have come to realize [the] great improbability of expecting [a] negotiated settlement," Rhee would inform the American ambassador, "there may be hope for achievement of peace in Korea and elsewhere in the world" (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XVI, The Geneva Conference, pp. 114-15). After negotiations lasting from April 26 until June 15, the Conference would in fact fail to produce a settlement. The sixteen nations under United Nations Command would sign a declaration stressing the refusal of the Communists to accept the authority of the United Nations and its supervision of free elections as the reason for failure. "It is better to face the fact of our disagreement," the declaration stated, "than to raise false hopes and mislead the peoples of the world into believing that there is agreement when there is none" (ibid., pp. 385-86; see also Bailey, Korean Armistice, pp. 150-70). Three days after the Geneva negotiations ended Dulles would invite Rhee to Washington for further consultations. Discussions between the two delegations would take place in late July (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pt. 2, pp. 1808, 1833, 1839-62; see also Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. V, 1953-1954, pp. 238-45). For developments see no. 1277. 5 See no. 788. 6 For discussions on these issues see NSC meeting minutes, Apr. 14, 1954, AWF/NSC, and State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XV, Korea, pt. 2, pp. 1777-85. 7 Retired General James Van Fleet would head a ten-week fact-finding mission to the Far East, returning to the United States on July 15. He would recommend a ROK army of thirty divisions, six of which would be reserve units, and no change in force levels for the navy, air force, and marines. General John Hull, Commander in Chief, Far East, would recommend a thirty division total, twenty-one of which would be reserve units, and the establishment of air force and navy reserve organizations (Watson, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. V, 1953-1954, pp. 241-42). For further developments see no. 957. 8 On the cabled copy of this letter Acting Secretary Smith would ask the American ambassador to inform Rhee that congressional action was required before plans to further aid Korea could be implemented; any plans referred to in the President's letter, he said, "would of course be predicated upon continuing ROK cooperation with the US, including ROK attendance at the Geneva Conference" (AWF/I: Korea). Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Syngman Rhee, 16 April 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 832. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/832.cfm <--PREV Doc #831  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  First Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #833

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