Presidential Papers, Doc#839 Cable TEDUL 5. Top secret. Eyes only To John Foster Dulles, 23 April 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #839; April 23, 1954
To John Foster Dulles
Series: EM, AWF, Dulles-Herter Series ; Category: Cable TEDUL 5. Top secret. Eyes only

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part V: Maintaining "a united defense"; April 1954 to August 1954
Chapter 10: Losing the war "they could not win"

 

Dear Foster: My first reaction upon reading your report on your initial conversation with Bidault is to assure you of my full understanding of the feeling of frustration that must consume you.1 I refer particularly to our earlier efforts to get French to ask for internationalization of the war, and to get the British to appreciate the seriousness of the situation of Dien Bien Phu and the probable result on the entire war of defeat at that place.2 There is little I can say now to help you rally the spirits and determination of our allies, but I am so confident of the unity of convictions you and I hold on these and related matters that I do not even feel the need of assuring you again of my complete support.

I do suggest that you make sure the British Government fully appreciates the gravity of the situation and the great danger of French collapse in that region. The British must not be able merely to shut their eyes and later plead blindness as an alibi for failing to propose a positive program.3

Winston has cabled me asking to come over here about 20 May.4 I have no objection to a full and frank talk, but I am bound to say that I see no profit in it unless they are ready to look facts in the face and take and support obviously necessary decisions. I shall not answer him until I hear from you. I shall not be back in Washington for several days.5

In the meantime, I am thankful, on behalf of America, that we have in you such a skilled and devoted representative to support our interests in these fateful days.6 With warm regard

1 For background see no. 816. Dulles, in Paris for a NATO meeting, had discussed Indochina with French Foreign Minister Bidault and with General Paul Ely, Chairman of the French Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the twenty-second (Dulles to Eisenhower, DULTE 2, Apr. 22, 1954, AWF/D-H; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, p. 1351). The French leaders told Dulles that Dien Bien Phu would fall unless the United States mounted a massive air attack against the surrounding Vietminh troops. Bidault also "indicated that while he had been opposed to internationalizing the war, he would favor it now with US if it would save Dien Bien Phu." Bidault dismissed Dulles's requirement for British participation and warned that if the garrison fell there would be little interest in Dulles's united action coalition. "The French would want to pull out entirely from southeast Asia, and assume no continuing commitments and the rest of us would have to get along without France in this area."

Dulles's cable also discussed the prospects for French ratification of the European Defense Community (see nos. 720 and 958). Bidault had told the Secretary of State that socialist support for EDC had eroded and that it would now be necessary to court the French right in order to create a firm base of support for the measure. Eisenhower sent his cable to Under Secretary of State Smith for immediate transmission to Dulles (Eisenhower to Smith, Apr. 23, 1954, AWF/D-H).

2 The situation at Dien Bien Phu had worsened; see no. 841.

3 Dulles and JCS Chairman Arthur Radford would meet with British Foreign Secretary Eden in Paris on April 24. Dulles told the British that Eisenhower was prepared to ask Congress for authorization to use American combat forces in Indochina if the British would contribute military forces to his united action coalition. He warned the British that if Indochina fell the United States would be forced to take measures against Communist China, including seizure of Hainan Island and a blockade of the Chinese coast (State, Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. XIII, Indochina, pt. 1, pp. 1386-91). When Dulles and Eden again met in Geneva on April 25, they differed on the question of immediate military aid. Dulles warned Eden that their two countries had to "give the French some hope for future support" or the French would not "be able to stand the loss of Dien Bien Phu." Eden replied that "the UK could give no commitment in advance of Geneva guaranteeing Indochina, or implying its defense" (Memorandum of Conversation, Apr. 25, 1954, AWF/D-H).

4 See no. 840.

5 Eisenhower would leave Washington on this day to fly to Kentucky and, in the evening, to Augusta, Georgia. He would return to Washington on the night of April 25.

6 In reply Dulles would tell Eisenhower that he was "deeply touched by, and grateful for," his message (DULTE 8, Apr. 23, 1954, AWF/D-H). He would acknowledge that France was "almost visibly collapsing under our eyes" although there was "no (repeat no) military or logical reason why [the] loss of Dien Bien Phu should lead to collapse of French will, in relation both to Indochina and EDC." Dulles also would say that his "basic reaction" to Churchill's request for a meeting was the same as Eisenhower's, "namely, that a meeting should solemnize and publicize a major decision sufficiently explored and developed in advance to be sure that it is in hand." For developments see nos. 841, 842, 844.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable TEDUL 5. Top secret. Eyes only To John Foster Dulles, 23 April 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 839. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/839.cfm

 


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