Dear
Al: I am most appreciative of your letter.1 While I had some secondhand reports of your feeling that the French leaders had practically abdicated, I had not before known of your personal views with respect to the astonishing proposal for unilateral American intervention in Indo-China.2 Your adverse opinion exactly parallels mine.
As you know, you and I started more than three years ago trying to convince the French that they could not win the Indo-China war and particularly could not get real American support in that region unless they would unequivocally pledge independence to the Associated States upon the achievement of military victory.3 Along with this--indeed as a corollary to it--this Administration has been arguing that no Western power can go to Asia militarily, except as one of a concert of powers, which concert must include local Asiatic peoples.4
To contemplate anything else is to lay ourselves open to the charge of imperialism and colonialism or--at the very least--of objectionable paternalism. Even, therefore, if we could by some sudden stroke assure the saving of the Dien Bien Phu garrison, I think that under the conditions proposed by the French the free world would lose more than it would gain. Neither the British nor the French would now agree with the coalition idea--though for widely differing reasons. Consequently, we have had to stand by while the tactical situation has grown worse and worse. Now, unless there should be a sudden development of discouragement on the part of the enemy, it looks as if Dien Bien Phu could scarcely survive. (Not that I, either as a local or a theatre commander, would ever agree to this. I believe that as long as the garrison can get food and ammunition, it can hold out. Of course it is not difficult to imagine conditions under which such re-supply would become impossible.)
One of the great difficulties that the French seem to have these days is the inability of its government to make up its mind as to what to do in any given set of circumstances. Ever since 1945 France has been unable to decide whether she most fears Russia or Germany. As a consequence, her policies in Europe have been nothing but confusion; starts and stops; advances and retreats! She wants still to be considered a world power, but is entirely unready to make the sacrifices necessary to sustain such a position. She prefers to limit her sacrifices and so, finally, she is bound to be shown up, as in Indo-China, as incapable of doing anything important by herself.
The result of this indecision has been tragic for her. She has been losing at one and the same time both her position as a world power and the sympathy and respect of free peoples.
For those of us who have recognized and admired the basic virtues of the great mass of Frenchmen, this spectacle has been saddening indeed. It seems incredible that a nation which had only the help of a tiny British Army when it turned back the German flood in 1914 and withstood the gigantic 1916 attacks at Verdun could now be reduced to the point that she cannot produce a few hundred technicians to keep planes flying properly in Indo-China.5
I believe the difficulty is largely a matter of spirit; unfortunately there is no one in sight who seems to have the capability of reversing the trend toward pessimism, defeatism and dejection. As you will remember, you and I once thought that Pleven could possibly do it--now you report that he seems to be one of the most emphatic in proclaiming French futility.6
The only hope is to produce a new and inspirational leader--and I do not mean one that is 6 feet 5 and who considers himself to be, by some miraculous biological and transmigrative process, the offspring of Clemenceau and Jeanne d'Arc.7
Maybe, if you learn to speak French, you might qualify! I could get you a suit of nice shiny white armor!
In any event, it is all very frustrating and discouraging, but I do believe as follows:
(a). That the loss of Dien Bien Phu does not necessarily mean the loss of the Indo-China war.
(b). The heroic exploits of the French garrison (which are all the more wonderful in view of the weak support they have had from Paris) should be glorified and extolled as indicative of the French character and determination.
(c). We should all (United States, France, Thailand, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, et al) begin conferring at once on means of successfully stopping the Communist advances in Southeast Asia.
(d). The plan should include the use of the bulk of the French Army in Indo-China.
(e). The plan should assure freedom of political action to Indo-China promptly upon attainment of victory.
(f). Additional ground forces should come from Asiatic and European troops already in the region.8
(g). The general security and peaceful purposes and aims of such a concert of nations should be announced publicly--as in NATO. Then we possibly wouldn't have to fight.
Augusta was fine, but I had to take a couple of grueling days out for a trip to New York and Kentucky. If you have any specific suggestions for our June encounter, let me know.9
Give my love to Grace, and, as always, the best to yourself.
As ever
