Dear
Winston: Thank you very much for your message, just this minute received.1 Of course I am not vexed. Personal trust based upon more than a dozen years of close association and valued friendship may occasionally permit room for amazement but never for suspicion. Moreover, I cannot too strongly emphasize to you my prayerful hope that your mission, if you pursue it, may be crowned with complete success. My appreciation of the acute need for peace and understanding in the world certainly far transcends any personal pride in my judgments or convictions. No one could be happier than I to find that I have been wrong in my conclusion that the men in the Kremlin are not to be trusted no matter how great the apparent solemnity and sincerity with which they might enter into an agreement or engagement.
Unfortunately I find no reason for taking a brighter view of the Tonkin Delta situation than is expressed in your fourth paragraph.2 This, of course, is all the more exasperating to our people because they are well aware that ever since I came into office this government has been suggesting and urging some internationalization of the Indo-China conflict so as to mark it clearly as another instance of Communist aggression against the independence of small countries. In this case I do not think it a harsh judgment to observe that the French have been wrong both from the viewpoint of world peace and of their own prestige. Again I suppose we must sadly observe that that is now history.
At this moment the international question that most engages the attention of our people is the possibility that some kind of armistice in Indo-China will be used as an excuse for raising the issue of Red China's entrance into the United Nations. You, of course, put the case very succinctly when you said to me that there can be no serious consideration of this proposition as long as the United Nations is at war with China over the Korean question.3 On this one matter I honestly believe that American opinion is so firmly fixed that in the absence of a series of deeds that would evidence a complete reversal of Red China's attitude, the introduction of this question for debate in the United Nations would create real difficulty in this country. This is far less a matter of geography than of principle. I have heard it said that America makes a mistake in attempting to introduce moral codes into international relationships and that morals and diplomacy have nothing in common. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the American people like to think that they are being just and fair in these matters and therefore they will not be brow-beaten into accepting something that they consider completely unfair, unjust and immoral.
The bill of particulars against Red China includes, among many other things, its invasion of North Korea where its armies still are stationed. Secondly, Red China by its own admission illegally holds a number of Americans as prisoners.4 This outrages our entire citizenry. Third, Communist China has been the principal source of the military strength used in the illicit and unjust aggression in Indo-China. Finally, Red China has been guilty of the most atrocious deportment in her dealings with the Western World. At Geneva it excoriated the United Nations and asked for the repudiation of decisions by that body. Red China has been worse than insulting in its communications to ourselves and others, while the public statements of its officials have been characterized by vilification and hatred.5
Frankly, I have no worries whatsoever about the ability of your government and this one to keep Anglo-American relationships on a sound, friendly and cooperative basis as long as this one question, which looms so importantly in the American mind, does not rise up to plague us. I pray that you and our other friends may be able, as long as Red China persists in her inexcusable conduct, to help us keep this one matter from appearing on the agenda either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly of the United Nations.
With warm personal regard,6 As ever
