Presidential Papers, Doc#993 Secret To James Harold Doolittle, 26 July 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #993; July 26, 1954
To James Harold Doolittle
Series: EM, AWF, Administration Series: Allen Dulles Corr. ; Category: Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XV - The Presidency: The Middle Way
Part V: Maintaining "a united defense"; April 1954 to August 1954
Chapter 11: The "men in the Kremlin are not to be trusted"

 

Re: Panel of Consultants on Covert Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency

Dear General Doolittle:1 I have requested you, and you have agreed, to act as Chairman of a panel of consultants to conduct a study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency.2 With your concurrence I have invited Messrs. William B. Franke, Morris Hadley, and William Pawley to act with you as members of the panel. Mr. S. Paul Johnston has kindly agreed to serve as Executive Director of the panel.3

It is my desire that the Panel of Consultants should undertake a comprehensive study of the covert activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, in particular those carried out under the terms of NSCID #5 of August 28, 1951, and NSC 5412 of March 15, 1954.4 You will consider the personnel factors, the security, the adequacy, the efficacy and the relative costs of these operations and, as far as possible, equate the cost of the over-all efforts to the results achieved. You will make any recommendations calculated to improve the conduct of these operations. To the extent that agencies of the Government, other than the Central Intelligence Agency, are engaged in covert operations which may parallel, duplicate, or supplement the operations of CIA, you may investigate such other operations conducted by any other department or agency of the Government in order to insure, insofar as practicable, that the field of foreign clandestine operations is adequately covered and that there is no unnecessary duplication of effort or expense.

In view of the particularly sensitive nature of these covert operations, their relation to the conduct of our foreign policy, and the fact that these sensitive operations are carried on pursuant to National Security Council action approved by me, I desire that your report be made to me personally and classified TOP SECRET. I will determine whether or not the report or any part thereof should have any further dissemination. I should appreciate it if your report could be available to me prior to October 1, 1954.

As you know, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, generally known as the Hoover Commission, is constituting a Task Force to study and make recommendations with respect to the organization and methods of operations of the CIA. General Mark W. Clark has been designated by Mr. Hoover to head this Task Force which, I understand, will probably be organized and start its work sometime in September next.5 Under the law constituting the Hoover Commission, the Task Force shall study and investigate the present organization and methods of operation of the Agency to determine what changes therein are necessary to accomplish the policy of Congress to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service by:

a. recommending methods and procedures for reducing expenditures to the lowest amount consistent with the efficient performance of essential services, activities and functions;

b. eliminating duplication and overlapping of services, activities, and functions;

c. consolidating services, activities, and functions of a similar nature;

d. abolishing services, activities, and functions not necessary to the efficient conduct of Government;

e. eliminating nonessential services, functions, and activities which are competitive with private enterprise;

f. defining responsibilities of officials; and

g. relocating agencies now responsible directly to the President in departments or other agencies.

As the work of the Hoover Task Force will get under way shortly, I suggest that you and General Clark confer in order to avoid any unnecessary duplication of work as between you. The distinction between the work of your Study Group and the Hoover Task Force is this:

You will deal with the covert activities of the CIA as indicated in paragraph (2) above, and your report will be submitted to me. General Clark's Task Force will deal largely with the organization and methods of operation of the CIA and other related agencies within the limits prescribed in the law as outlined in paragraph (4) above. Reports of the Hoover Commission are made to the Congress.

The purpose of these studies, both that of the Hoover Task Force and that of your Group, is to insure that the United States Government develops an appropriate mechanism for carrying out its over-all intelligence responsibilities and the related covert operations. I consider these operations are essential to our national security in these days when international Communism is aggressively pressing its world-wide subversive program.6 Sincerely

1 For background on the retired Air Force general who was, at this time, vice-president of Shell Oil Company see Eisenhower Papers, vols. I-XI.

2 Eisenhower had met with Doolittle on July 7. A motivating factor in the decision to undertake this study (which was not announced publicly) and the Hoover Commission study, also described in this document, was probably Senator Joseph McCarthy's claim that the CIA was infiltrated with Communists and his implied intention to investigate the agency (see no. 932; New York Times, June 3, 1954; Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. II, The President, p. 189; Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, The CIA and American Democracy [New Haven, 1989], p. 102; Harry H. Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security [Cambridge, 1958], pp. 181-82; William M. Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents [University, Alabama, 1984], pp. 6, 64-65.

3 Franke was assistant secretary of the Navy for financial management; Hadley (B.A. Yale 1916) was a New York attorney and chairman of the board of the Carnegie Corporation; and Pawley, longtime friend of Eisenhower, had been ambassador to both Brazil and Peru. Johnston (B.S. Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1916) was a New York aviation executive.

4 NSCID #5 had provided guidelines for the espionage and counterespionage operations of the CIA (The Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, 2, no. 3 [1976], 165). NSC 5412 had presented the rationale for covert operations, placed responsibility for them under the CIA, and had directed that these operations be planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. policy (WHO/OSANSA: NSC, Policy Papers).

5 For background see no. 932. The task force would begin its meetings on October 18.

6 General Doolittle and the members of his committee would present their report to Eisenhower on October 19. Explaining that he had reviewed the findings with CIA Director Dulles, Doolittle "emphasized that the report was constructive criticism and in no sense a white wash." The report emphasized Dulles's "unique knowledge of his subject," and commended the director as "a man of of great honesty, integrity, loyally supported by his staff." The committee, however, questioned the competence of Dulles's assistants and criticized the sloppiness of the organization, its lack of discipline, and "complete lack of security consciousness."

The report also cautioned that the fraternal relationship between the director and the Secretary of State could lead to the "protection of one by the other or [the] influence of one by the other." Eisenhower rejected this opinion. The relationship with the Secretary of State "did not disturb him"; in fact, Eisenhower said, it had been beneficial since much of the CIA's work was an extension of that of the State Department. Doolittle also believed that Allen Dulles was "highly emotional," particularly in regard to criticism of his staff. "His emotionalism," Doolittle asserted, "was far worse than it appeared on the surface." Eisenhower again disagreed, stating that he had never seen the CIA director "show the slightest disturbance." An intelligence organization is "one of the most peculiar types of operation any government can have," Eisenhower said, "and . . . it probably takes a strange kind of genius to run it" (Ann Whitman memorandum, Oct. 19, 1954, AWF/AWD; see also Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. II, The President, pp. 226-27).

Doolittle's committee concluded: "It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United States is to survive, longstanding American concepts of `fair play' must be reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy our enemies by more clever, more sophisticated and more effective methods than those used against us" (Leary, ed., The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, p. 144). On October 19 Doolittle would state publicly that the CIA was doing a "creditable job" although important areas of organization, administration, and operations could be improved (New York Times, Oct. 20, 1954). Eisenhower would give CIA Director Dulles the report on October 22 with instructions to share it with no one and report back to him regarding the conclusions and recommendations (Memorandum, Oct. 10, 1954, AWF/A). Dulles would meet with Eisenhower four days later.

General Clark's report would be made public on June 28, 1955. For more on the Hoover Commission see no. 1189.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To James Harold Doolittle, 26 July 1954. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 993. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-term/documents/993.cfm

 


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