<--PREV Doc #1219  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1221 Document #1220; June 29, 1959 To Francis Wilfred de Guingand Series: EM, AWF, Name Series ; Category: Personal and confidential The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace Part VII: Berlin and the Chance for a Summit; March 1959 to August 1959 Chapter 17: "Sources of division" among allies   [Dear Freddie:] Your letter is truly interesting. I am sorry that so many people seem to get a little wisdom only with hindsight.1 As you know, I have said not a word publicly in criticism of any officer of World War II, including Monty. Following the policy of ignoring such criticism publicly, I have also, except in such circumstances as when you and I met, avoided conversations of this type, even in private.2 In other words, I have never allowed such matters to disturb me more than momentarily. But this does not mean that many others--especially my old military friends and associates--have failed to voice considerable resentment, possibly out of a feeling of loyalty to me.3 The telecasting of an interview (which many of my friends saw but which I did not) has seemed to many people here as a deliberate affront. A number of people, including editorial writers and military friends, have expressed the thought that no matter what might be the advantage now of pondering the military "might-have-beens", the fact remains that the war in Western Europe was conducted under the program that I personally laid out in broad outline and victory was achieved much more rapidly than "official" prophets had foreseen.4 All this you know. I merely make the point that, because of the resentment on the part of some of my old friends, it would likely be bad judgment, at this particular time, for Monty to make any attempt to visit me.5 I assure you that my feeling is merely one of disappointment, not of rancor. Even Winston, when he was here, remarked that obviously I felt little personal resentment toward Monty’s publicity endeavors because he (Winston) had noted that, in our living quarters on the second floor of the White House, Monty’s picture occupied the same place as in former years.6 My feelings about any visit apply also to any explanatory statement Monty might conceivably make about the affair. He obviously cannot retreat from a public position that he has already made clear; consequently there would be no hope of such a statement making for better "allied" feeling. Likewise, I think any correspondence between us could not be very helpful because of the reason that Monty, both by publications and broadcasts, has made the whole matter a public affair, not a private one. All this is, of course, negative. But I feel that if the matter is to be healed in any way, that time will have to be relied on as the healer. I hope you are getting along with making inquiries of our British friends about the possibility of the "reunion" next year.7 I did not include Winston in the list because obviously he is far from strong and I think we should not ask him to waste any of his energy. Similarly I hope you will not urge anyone else to make a trip that would impose any kind of health risk. I cannot tell you what a great privilege I felt it was to me to have Winston here. The same goes for your visit. I thoroughly enjoyed it. Write to me when you can. P.S. If you personally have any different opinions about any of this, of course I will be glad to hear them. 1 De Guingand had written June 14 (AWF/N) that he had met with Field Marshal Montgomery, who "admitted that he had gone too far and had 'overstated the case'" in his Memoirs and in a recent televised interview (see also de Guingand to Eisenhower, May 8, 1959, AWF/N). In his Memoirs Montgomery had found fault with Eisenhower's wartime military leadership as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (for background on the controversy surrounding the volume, and the President's reaction to the publication see, for example, nos. 989 and 1012). In an interview aired on April 28 Montgomery had criticized U.S. leadership since World War II and repeated his criticism of Eisenhower's role during the war (see no. 1146 and New York Times, Apr. 29, 1959). 2 The President had had lunch with de Guingand on June 4 (see no. 1194). 3 For examples of the correspondence Eisenhower had received see nos. 933 and 970. 4 Montgomery had maintained that a direct thrust toward Berlin would have shortened the war. On January 14 Eisenhower had said that at the outset of operation overlord (June 6, 1944), the "most optimistic prediction" of German surrender was two years. In fact the war in Europe ended eleven months following the Normandy invasion (Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1959, p. 31; also see nos. 948, 1018, 1381, and 1722). 5 Montgomery had considered writing to the President or making a short visit to the United States in an effort to restore Anglo-American relations, de Guingand had written. 6 On Churchill's visit to the White House see no. 1174. 7 On Eisenhower's plans to have a reunion of wartime friends see no. 1197. For developments see no. 1229. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and confidential To Francis Wilfred de Guingand, 29 June 1959. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1220. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/1220.cfm <--PREV Doc #1219  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1221

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