Presidential Papers, Doc#1541 To Alberto Lleras Camargo, 19 May 1960. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #1541; May 19, 1960
To Alberto Lleras Camargo
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Colombia

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part IX: Shattered Dreams; March 1960 to July 1960
Chapter 22: Disaster in Paris

 

Dear Mr. President:1 In view of the happenings of the last few days, you may have some interest in my assessment of the trends regarding events--or rather the lack of them--at the Paris meeting and their significance to all of us.2

As you recall, I recently requested my ambassador to your country to outline to you in general terms the hopes I cherished for the relaxation of tensions as I prepared to come to Paris for the long-planned Summit Conference. These hopes were also expressed to me by the Presidents of the Latin American countries I was able to visit this last February and March.3

Unfortunately these hopes proved further away than I realized at the time. As a result of a chain of events within the Soviet Union which is not clear to me at this time, Mr. Khrushchev must have concluded before coming to Paris that progress at a Summit Meeting would be either undesirable or impossible. Accordingly, he embarked on a calculated campaign, even before it began to insure the failure of the conference and to see to it that the onus for such failure would fall on the West, particularly the United States.

As a device, Mr. Khrushchev seized upon his successful downing of an unarmed United States civilian reconnaissance plane, which admittedly was flying over Soviet territory. I need not assure you that this activity was not intentionally provocative and certainly not aggressive; it constituted one phase of an intelligence system made necessary for defense against surprise attack on the part of a nation which boasts of its capability to "bury" us all4--and one which stubbornly maintains the most rigid secrecy in all its activities.

At least this incident, while regrettable in the extreme, could not by any stretch of the imagination be of such magnitude as to justify the polemics and the abuse which Mr. Khrushchev saw fit to heap upon the United States. By so distorting and exaggerating this incident, he of course put an end, for the time being, to any hopes of progress.

My purpose in writing this letter, Mr. President, is primarily to assure you that my objectives, in spite of the occurrence at this meeting, remain completely unchanged. I am sure that this experience will serve to strengthen the ties that bind your country and mine, and that it will point up the long-term challenge to the Free World that requires the utmost in unity and cooperation.

I have every hope that as time goes by, the world will come to appreciate ever more strongly the urgent need for control of armaments, for mutual understanding, and for mutual respect among all men.

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my continued respect and esteem.5 Sincerely

1 Dr. Lleras Camargo, president of Colombia since August 1958, had been ambassador to the United States during World War II. He had also served as Colombia’s minister for foreign affairs, secretary-general of the Organization of the Americas, and president of the University of Los Andes. This message, drafted by State Department officials, was sent to the American embassy in Bogota for delivery. Similar messages were sent to the leaders of fifteen other Latin American countries and to the leaders of Greece, India, Iran, Italy, Morocco, Spain, Tunisia, and Turkey, countries Eisenhower had visited on his goodwill tour in December. The letters and the responses they generated are in AWF/I.

2 On the collapse of the summit meeting see no. 1538.

3 On Eisenhower’s South American trip see no. 1403.

4 See no. 1107 for Khrushchev’s threat to bury the United States.

5 President Lleras Camargo would tell Eisenhower that he had held "high hopes" for the reduction in international tension that might have resulted from a successful conference. "However," he wrote, "no careful observer of developments in Soviet policy could have failed to be somewhat skeptical of a total or partial agreement in the long-standing conflicts that characterize the period known as the Cold War" (Lleras Camargo to Eisenhower, May 28, 1960, AWF/I: Colombia; see also Calhoun to Goodpaster, June 8, 1960, ibid.).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Alberto Lleras Camargo, 19 May 1960. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1541. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/1541.cfm

 


Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission
1629 K Street, NW Suite 801
Washington DC 20006
Phone: 202.296.0004    Fax: 202.296.6464