Presidential Papers, Doc#1662 To Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 October 1960. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #1662; October 2, 1960
To Jawaharlal Nehru
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Nehru

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XXI - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part X: Ending an Era; August 1960 to January 1961
Chapter 24: "We missed by such a narrow margin"

 

Dear Prime Minister: I have received your letter of September twenty-ninth, informing me of your intention to submit to the current session of the General Assembly a resolution calling for a meeting between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and myself.1 I assure you again that I share the concern expressed in this communication over the present state of international relations, and I understand and sympathize with the motives which led you to propose this step.

As President of the United States I have sought on every occasion to explore to the full any possibility for the resolution of outstanding international questions by negotiation.

Following the refusal last May of the Soviet Government to participate in the long-awaited Summit Conference which was to deal with certain of these questions, especially disarmament and problems arising out of the war, the President of France, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and I issued a declaration which stated: "They remain unshaken in their conviction that all outstanding international questions should not be settled by threat or the use of force but by peaceful means through negotiation. They themselves remain ready to take part in such negotiations at any suitable time in the future." Speaking for the United States this statement still holds good.2

I have at no time utilized any threats whatsoever with reference to any international question. This is, I am sure you will agree, a matter of historical record.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, far from following a comparable policy of restraint, appears to have undertaken with deliberate intent a policy of increasing tension throughout the world and in particular of damaging relations with the United States.

Instead of avoiding threats of the use of force, the Soviet Government has threatened rocket retaliation against many members of the United Nations including the United States on the pretext of contrived and imaginary intentions on the part of these countries. While these threats have necessarily only strengthened our resolve to maintain our readiness to deter and, if necessary, to resist any aggression, they have nevertheless caused uneasiness throughout the world.

The Soviet Government has refused any thought of an impartial international body to investigate the shooting down on July first of an aircraft of the United States Air Force, and is still holding incommunicado two members of its crew.3

The Soviets have unilaterally disrupted the ten-nation disarmament talks in Geneva with full knowledge that the Western Powers there represented were about to submit new proposals which took into account those made earlier by the Soviet Union.4

I believe that a comparison of the international behavior of the participants of the Paris Meeting since its collapse demonstrates where the responsibility lies for the increase of international tension and the failure to make any progress in the solution of outstanding problems.

I reiterate what I said in my speech before the General Assembly on September twenty-second:5 "The United States is always ready to undertake serious negotiations with the Soviet Union and other interested countries on any unresolved international question, and especially in the field of disarmament." I also pointed out that there are needs for great constructive action, for which I have made proposals to the General Assembly, that are primary in their importance to the peace and progress of major areas of the world. However, the chief problems in the world today are not due to differences between the Soviet Union and the United States alone, and therefore are not possible of solution on a bilateral basis.

The questions which are disrupting the world at the present time are of immediate and vital concern to other nations as well. The importance of these matters is such as to go beyond personal or official relations between any two individuals, and I have many times personally pledged myself, regardless of every kind of personal consideration, to meet with anyone at any time if there is any serious promise of productive results. There is nothing in the words or actions of the Government of the Soviet Union which gives me any reason to believe that the meeting you suggest would hold any such promise. I would not wish to participate in a mere gesture which in present circumstances might convey a thoroughly misleading and unfortunate impression to the peoples of the world.

If the Soviet Union seriously desires a reduction in tensions it can readily pave the way for useful negotiations by actions in the United Nations and elsewhere. If Soviet representatives should wish to discuss concrete measures to reduce tensions, my representatives, including the Secretary of State, are always available for this purpose. Should such exploratory discussions reveal that the Soviet Union is prepared to return to the path of peaceful negotiation with some prospect of fruitful results, then I personally would be prepared to meet and negotiate with the representative of the Soviet Government and with the heads of other governments as their interests were involved.6 Sincerely

1 Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s letter was signed by the presidents of Ghana, Yugoslavia, Indonesia, and the United Arab Republic (all in AWF/I; the draft resolution is in AWF/I: Ghana). Eisenhower had told Secretary of State Herter that he thought Khrushchev had "stirred up" the five nations and that the resolution was "so illogical" that it had to have been "contrived." Nehru’s participation with the other four neutral nations had particularly irritated him, Eisenhower said. Eisenhower told Herter that he was opposed to recognizing the five leaders as a neutral bloc. "Each one is important enough to answer individually," he said, "but their act in submitting the resolution together is one of effrontery." He told Herter that he had worked on the State Department draft of the reply to make it "more convincing" and "tougher." The most important consideration, Eisenhower said, was to make sure the resolution did not pass. Eisenhower had also discussed the reply with Prime Minister Macmillan, who agreed that the West had to rescue the neutral nations from the "foolish position" in which they had placed themselves (Goodpaster, Memorandums of Conference, Oct. 1, 5, 6, 1960, AWF/D; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. II, United Nations and General International Matters, pp. 370 - 71, 380; and Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 586 - 88).

A State Department draft of this response with Eisenhower’s handwritten emendations is in AWF/D. Identical letters were sent to the leaders of the other four countries (see AWF/I).

2 On the failed Summit Conference see no. 1538.

3 On the downed plane see no. 1583.

4 See no. 1577.

5 See Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1960 - 61, pp. 707 - 20; see also no. 1638.

6 On October 5 Under Secretary of State Dillon would tell Eisenhower that Japan and Argentina had offered to sponsor an "innocuous" alternative resolution that would be acceptable to the United States. He would not have objected if the original resolution had read "two governments," Eisenhower said; he objected to mentioning two individuals by name (John S. D. Eisenhower, Memorandum of Conference, Oct. 5, 1960, AWF/D). In a meeting on October 6 Eisenhower would tell Indonesian President Sukarno that he "had no quarrel" with the intent of the resolution, but "he did not see what good could be achieved by such a meeting" (Goodpaster, Memorandum of Conference, Oct. 6, 1960, ibid.). The General Assembly would eliminate references to the U.S. and Soviet leaders from the resolution, but Nehru and the the other sponsors would withdraw it on October 5 (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. II, United Nations and General International Matters, p. 399).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Jawaharlal Nehru, 2 October 1960. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1662. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/1662.cfm

 


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