<--PREV Doc #1748  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1750 Document #1749; December 31, 1960 To Harold Macmillan Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Macmillan ; Category: Cable. Secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XXI - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace Part X: Ending an Era; August 1960 to January 1961 Chapter 25: Farewells and Warnings   Dear Harold:1 Your cable on the Laotian situation puzzles me because of your statement that we have been following diverging lines of effort. Certainly we agree with you that Phouma should resign, and it has been my understanding that some representatives of your government were undertaking to bring this about.2 At the same time we have been bringing to bear all the influence we can muster to get parliamentary approval of Boun Oum’s claim to recognition as the head of the constitutional government. He has seemed resistant.3 Conversations with the State Department confirm that my understanding, as indicated above, is also theirs. So far as the question of the International Commission is concerned, I have understood that Boun Oum and his associates have been firmly, up until this moment, opposed to its return to Laos.4 In any event, it would be difficult for me to see how the International Commission could be helpful to us and to our side before Boun Oum’s position had been certified as legal by his Parliament. This morning it appears quite likely that this whole matter has been overtaken by events. Fragmentary reports are to the effect that the North Vietminh are invading Laos to help the Pathet Lao and that Chinese troops may have been parachuted into the area. These reports, if true, put the whole matter on a much more urgent basis than heretofore. For my part I cannot see any course other than supporting the King and Boun Oum and their government with every immediately available resource, in the meantime continuing efforts to make clear the legitimacy of the Boun Oum position. I heartily agree with all you say about the need for unity, and you know how earnest have been my efforts to achieve it in all our relations. Indeed a vital factor in my decision in the troublesome question of voting for or abstention in the matter of the Asia-African resolution was that in such a welter of conflicting considerations the need for us standing together was of the utmost importance.5 I feel that all of us who see the dangers in a Laotian invasion should immediately make our intentions to oppose the move clear to each other and before the world and each of us move rapidly to do his part so that our essential unity cannot be questioned.6 Happy New Year! With warm regard 1 Several drafts of this message, with Eisenhower’s handwritten emendations, are in AWF/I: Macmillan. 2 For background on the tangled Laotian situation see no. 1320. Although the conflict in northern Laos had remained fairly quiet during the last part of 1959, political antagonisms between the Laotian King and its prime minister had resulted in a government takeover (Dec. 30) by the Royal Laotian Army. Attempts to unify the various anti-communist factions had failed, and another coup in August 1960 had resulted in the installation of Souvanna Phouma, a neutralist leader and former prime minister, as the new prime minister. Pro-Western Boun Oum, a pretender to the throne of the Kingdom of Southern Laos, became Secretary of State for National Defense. General Phoumi Nosavan, a leader in the December 1959 coup, had immediately asked for U.S. aid in overthrowing the new government. The American ambassador to Laos had recommended that the U.S. accept Souvanna Phouma as prime minister and work toward a reconciliation with Phoumi. The CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Defense Department, however, all viewed Souvanna Phouma as a Communist sympathizer and opposed the ambassador’s proposal. In September Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan began a revolt against the Souvanna Phouma government, and by December Souvanna had been forced to flee to Cambodia. The factions began fighting for control of Vientiane, the governmental capital, and American personnel were evacuated from the embassy compound. In an attempt to stabilize the situation the King had appointed Boun Oum as head of a provisional government--one that the United States could support. On this last day of 1960 State and Defense Department officials had reported to Eisenhower that forces from North Vietnam, supplied by airdrops from the Soviet Union, were moving into Laos, while two columns of Pathet Lao insurgents were converging on Vientiane, threatening to cut the country in half. Eisenhower stated that although he needed more information before authorizing military intervention, it might soon be time to employ the Seventh Fleet and its force of Marines against the Communists. The most important considerations, he said, were to pressure the Laotian parliament to legitimize the Boun Oum government and to solidify allied support for the U.S. position. "If war is necessary, we will do so with our allies or unilaterally, since we cannot sit by and see Laos go down without a fight" (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XVI, East Asia - Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, pp. 708 - 1029, passim, and Microfiche Supplement; Synopses of State and Intelligence Material Reported to the President, July - Dec., 1960, AWF/D; NSC meeting minutes, Mar. 17, July 21, Aug. 16, 25, Sept. 12, 15, 21, Oct. 6, 18, 24, Nov. 2, 8, Dec. 8, 21, 29, 1960, AWF/NSC; U.S. Department of State Bulletin 43, no. 1109 [September 26, 1960], 499; see also Herter to Eisenhower, Dec. 8, 1960, AWF/D-H; Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Herter, Nov. 21, 1960, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 607 - 10; Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 329 - 33; and Bernard B. Fall, Anatomy of a Crisis: The Laotian Crisis of 1960 - 1961 [Garden City, N.Y., 1969]). Macmillan had written that he was "disturbed" that for the first time in many years U.S.-British policies "although of the same strategic purpose," had been "a little divergent on tactics." He supported proposals meant to persuade Souvanna Phouma to resign and to convince Boun Oum to seek parliamentary sanction for his government. The first step, he said, was "to get established a proper legitimate government" (Macmillan to Eisenhower, Dec. 30, 1960, AWF/I: Macmillan). 3 Eisenhower had originally added the sentence, "He has seemed stubbornly reluctant" but changed it in a subsequent draft. He had also eliminated a sentence he had previously included: "Incidentally, we have had some indication that his reluctance is based upon a doubt that Parliament would endorse him." 4 The International Commission for the Supervision and Control of the Armistice in Laos (ICC), composed of Canada, Poland, and India, had been established as a result of the 1954 Geneva Accords (see Galambos and van Ee, The Middle Way, no. 873). With the establishment of a Laotian coalition government in 1956, the power of the ICC had been greatly reduced and its mission was terminated in July 1958 (State, Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXI, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, pp. 577 - 78, 860 - 61, 1045; State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XVI, East Asia - Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos, pp. 475 - 76). 5 On the Asian-African resolution see no. 1730. 8 For developments see no. 1752. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Secret To Harold Macmillan, 31 December 1960. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 1749. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/1749.cfm <--PREV Doc #1748  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #1750

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