Dear Prime Minister:1 A new and tragic chapter in the brief history of Laos as an independent nation has begun with the continuing air delivery of sizeable quantities of munitions and military supplies by the Soviet Union to Pathet Lao rebel forces and by substantially increased assistance to those forces, in both materiel and personnel, from north Viet-Nam.2 I am deeply troubled by the renewal of fratricidal warfare in this small and weak but strategically important Kingdom, whose only "offense" is geographical: it lies in the path of Communist expansionist intent in Asia, and is perhaps the most vulnerable spot on the entire periphery of the communist-controlled Eurasian land mass.
Concerned as I am by this renewed crisis in Laos, and knowing that you greatly share in that concern, I am moved to write to you in utmost frankness about my views of developments there, about the objectives of our efforts there, and about what are not our objectives. I know that there may be little if anything new to you in the facts I shall present, but I want very much to let you know my thinking on their implications for all of us.
Our policy with respect to Laos is consistent with our policy elsewhere in the world. We hope Laos, like other nations, will have an opportunity to develop in peace and freedom its fullest potential. It is obvious that Laos cannot be a threat to any of its neighbors--least of all to its two militarily strong communist neighbors.3 It is equally obvious that our presence in Laos is no threat to anyone. We have no military bases there, and seek none. We do not seek to have Laos join SEATO or any other alliance.
We have no quarrel whatsoever with a neutral policy for Laos, so long as the Lao Government desires it. We do, however, have our own grave reservations as to the threat to Laos caused by bringing into the Government communist-indoctrinated elements having the support of, and very probably under the guidance and direction of, outside communist powers, who also have the direct support of armed dissident elements within the country who are supplied and led from the outside. This, we believe, might well prove as disastrous to Laos as it has to other erstwhile independent nations. The conditions which now confront us result from the fact that the Pathet Lao have never observed the spirit and intent of the Vientiane accords of 1957, which attempted to absorb these Pathet Lao elements into the national life of Laos.4 There is ample evidence that the Neo Lao Hak Zat did not function as a political party only. It served as a vehicle for the communists’ enhanced political potential while retaining the military potential of the Pathet Lao forces.5 This military potential was later greatly expanded. Throughout the life of this struggling new nation nothing has posed any threat to it except communist-directed efforts to take it over. Efforts to attain this objective have gone on through the years, and a major source of their support has finally been most dramatically revealed through large-scale and continuing Soviet air drops to the rebels.
Our efforts in Laos have always been in support of the King and his Government. We supported Souvanna Phouma during the time he headed the Government, even though the lessons of Lao history over several years caused us to doubt the wisdom of many of his actions, and we felt certain that he would never be able to negotiate successfully a settlement with the communists short of virtually complete capitulation. We carried out our aid to Laos in accordance with his wishes and with his express permission. Even during extremely critical days we ceased, on November 30, all military supply under the existing military assistance agreements, in accordance with his wishes; we did not resume such support until the newly established government requested resumption on December 16.6
I am mindful of the fact that our respective Governments have not always advocated the same approach, perhaps due to our somewhat varying assessment of the predatory nature of the communist threat, but we have constantly worked for the same goal--the continued independence of Laos. I am sure you will agree that a communist bloc victory in the present hostilities would be a matter of grave concern to both our countries. It would, of course, extend the eastern prong of the pincers with which the Sino-Soviet bloc would like to envelop the Subcontinent, and would bring the security of the rest of the free Southeast Asian countries, four of whom border on Laos, into serious question.7
Since the USSR, for one reason or another, is providing strong military support for a drive to bring Laos under communist rule, this may be a new indication of their objectives: they may provide direct support for the Peiping regime’s military pressure on other countries bordering on territory under its control. I find it impossible to reconcile the present actions of the USSR and their Chinese Communist and North Vietnamese partners in Laos with the professed desire of the USSR for a peaceful world. If Mr. Khrushchev sincerely believes in "peaceful co-existence" he will withdraw USSR military assistance now being extended to communist-directed forces in Laos, and will exercise whatever influence he may possess to restrain his two partners.
We believe that the problem in Laos merits multinational attention. We would support an international control program which gave promise of insuring the security of Laos. I very much appreciated the interest evidenced by your Government’s approach to us in connection with the ICC.8 Our consistent policy has been to respect the position of the Lao Government on this question and we have outlined to you some of our reservations based on past performance in its areas of responsibility--due chiefly to communist-imposed restrictions on its functions and the blocking and delaying tactics of the Polish members.9 I do not have a closed mind on this subject, however, and expect that our two governments will remain in consultation as to the advisability of some sort of ICC action.
Events may move rapidly in the next few days. It is impossible to say now just what the Lao situation will require.
I hope that we will keep in close touch concerning this situation, which is of such obvious concern to both of us. I hope you will let me have the benefit of your ideas. President-elect Kennedy is being provided with full information so that he can follow developments closely.10
With warm regard, Sincerely
