Presidential Papers, Doc#25 To ibn Abd al-Aziz Saud, 5 February 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #25; February 5, 1957
To ibn Abd al-Aziz Saud
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Saudi Arabia

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVIII - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part I: A New Beginning, Old Problems; January 1957 to May 1957
Chapter 1: The Mideast and the Eisenhower Doctrine

 

Your Majesty: I have had the impression that the military program we are proposing is a substantial one.1 However, in reply to your letter I assure you that I shall look further into the details at once.2

I do hope you will not minimize in your own mind the importance of the training function. This is a long, even tedious, process. To perform this part of the work necessary to the development of an army, reconditioned equipment should be as good as the most expensive. I believe it would be to your advantage to avoid wear and tear on combat equipment while the troops are learning fundamentals.3

With great respect, Sincerely

1 For background see no. 13. The U.S. aid package, which stressed loans rather than outright grants, provided technical assistance. The proposal included $50 million over a five-year period for an air force and army training program; engineering surveys and loan assistance for economic projects; plus an agreement to sell the Saudis $110 million in arms (State, Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XIII, Near East: Jordan-Yemen, pp. 464 - 65).

2 In his letter King Saud had expressed dissatisfaction with the U.S. proposals. Military instructors and renovated equipment did not fulfill his country's need to create a strong army, King Saud said. Only with the "latest methods and the most modern equipment" could he maintain his country's integrity and independence (Saud to Eisenhower, Feb. 5, 1957, AWF/I: Saudi Arabia). Eisenhower had told Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben Buck Robertson, Jr., that the King believed the United States was "just going through the same old drill, saddling off on them reconditioned equipment." He asked Robertson to confer with State Department officials about revising the proposal. "The program now seems to be the same as was discussed before the King came here," Eisenhower said; "he cannot go back & report that he has done nothing better" (Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Robertson, Feb. 5, 1957, AWF/D).

3 In a subsequent conversation, Secretary Dulles would tell Robertson that the Administration wanted "to hold a little back" because the Saudis were "great traders. But in the end the Pres will have to throw something into the kitty" (Feb. 5, 1957, Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations). For developments see no. 77.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To ibn Abd al-Aziz Saud, 5 February 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 25. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/25.cfm

 


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