Presidential Papers, Doc#566 Personal and secret To Richard Milhous Nixon, 5 February 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #566; February 5, 1958
To Richard Milhous Nixon
Series: EM, AWF, Name Series: Disability of President Memo ; Category: Personal and secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part IV: Recession and Reform; February 1958 to May 1958
Chapter 8: "To engender confidence"

 

Dear Dick: As both of us know, there are differences of opinion as to the exact meaning of that feature of the Constitution which provides that the Vice President will have the powers and the duties of the President when the President is unable to discharge them. There is uncertainty expressed as to how there could be determined the degree of the President's disability that would justify transferring his powers and duties to the Vice President.1

An inability to discharge properly the powers and duties of the Presidency could come about in several ways. One would be disease or accident that would prevent the President from making important decisions. Such periods of inability could be prolonged but, even if only the length of hours, could require action should there be any question of real importance and urgency to be decided without delay.

Another form of inability could come about through a failure of communications between the President and the Capital at any time that he might be absent therefrom. A somewhat similar case might be an uncertainty about the whereabouts of the President, occasioned by a forced landing of the Presidential airplane.

Other types of inability could unquestionably arise.

There have been many proposals for clarifying this situation, some by law, others by Constitutional Amendment. My own opinion is that it would be difficult to write any law or an Amendment in such fashion as to take care of every contingency that might possibly occur. While the great area of uncertainty now existing could and should be drastically reduced, I am not sure that even the most carefully devised plan, objectively arrived at, could remove doubt in every instance.2

However, it seems to me that so far as you and I are concerned in the offices we now respectively hold, and particularly in view of our mutual confidence and friendship, we could do much to eliminate all these uncertainties by agreeing, in advance, as to the proper steps to be taken at any time when I might become unable to discharge the powers and duties of the President. Based upon my studies of the history of the Constitution and upon the advice of Constitutional authorities, I am of the opinion that this agreement would not in any way contravene the clear intention of the Constitution; on the contrary, it is rather a statement of our common intention to act completely according to the spirit of this portion of the Constitution.

Through such an agreement, we can assure that the best interests of the country would not be damaged by the doubts and indecisions that have at times existed in similar cases in the past. Moreover with this advance agreement, you could without personal or official embarrassment, make any decisions that seemed to you proper in cases where my ability to discharge my powers and duties may be in serious question.

This note, which I have been planning for some time to write, is merely to confirm, in writing, the gist of the agreement that you and I have reached between ourselves.3

It is simply stated:

In any instance in which I could clearly recognize my own inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency I would, of course, so inform you and you would act accordingly.

With the exception of this one kind of case, you will be the individual explicitly and exclusively responsible for determining whether there is any inability of mine that makes it necessary for you to discharge the powers and duties of the Presidency, and you will decide the exact timing of the devolution of this responsibility on you. I would hope that you would consult with the Secretary of State, Governor Adams and General Heaton, and if feasible, with medical experts assembled by him, but the decision will be yours only.

I will be the one to determine if and when it is proper for me to resume the powers and duties of the Presidency.

I know, of course, that you would make any decision for taking over the presidential powers and duties only when you feel it necessary. I have no fear that you, for any fleeting or inconsequential purpose, would do so and thereby create confusion in the government. Circumstances would have to guide you, and if the imminence or occurrence of any world or domestic emergency demanded, you would have to act promptly.

There is always the possibility that, as in the cases of Garfield and Wilson, I might, without warning, become personally incapable of making a decision at the moment when it should be made.4 The existence of this agreement recognizing your clear and exclusive responsibility for deciding upon the inability of the President to perform his duties and exercise his powers will remove any necessity or desire on the part of friends and staffs to impede the right and authority of the Vice President in reaching his decision on the matter.

There is only one final thought I would like to add. If any disability of mine should, in the judgment of any group of distinguished medical authorities that you might assemble, finally become of a permanent character, I would, of course, accept their decision and promptly resign my position. But if I were not able to do so, and the same group of consultants would so state, then you would take over not only the powers and duties but the perquisites of the Presidency, including the White House itself. In temporary cases of my "inability," we agree that you should act for the necessary period in your capacity as Vice President and, additionally, as "Acting President."5

With warm regard, As ever

1 On Eisenhower's concern for an orderly transfer of power to the Vice-President in the case of presidential disability see nos. 58 and 107.

2 In January the President had contemplated drafting a letter of resignation to be effective when a committee of five people of his own choosing should decide he was disabled (Ann Whitman memorandum, Jan. 3, 1958, AWF/AWD). After a discussion with Nixon, Eisenhower had asked White House aide Gerald Morgan to draft a letter, instructing him to discuss the matter with no one but the Attorney General. The letter was to state that should a disability take place, the committee could decide that the Vice-President should take over; at a later time, the committee could decide when the President was able to resume his duties. Eisenhower cited as an example, the possibility that he might be involved in an automobile accident, fall into a coma, but be perfectly able, after a time, to resume his duties. The President suggested that the committee be composed of Attorney General William Rogers, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, Republican House Leader Joseph Martin, Jr., and Major General Leonard Heaton, the Commanding General of Walter Reed Army Hospital. Eisenhower suggested that the fifth person on the committee might be the Secretary of State, or the Surgeon General of one of the services. He added that he wanted an alternate named in case any member of the committee could not serve (see Ann Whitman memorandum, Jan. 3, 1958, AWF/AWD; see also Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 231 - 35).

3 After his advisers persuaded him that a disability committee was impractical, Eisenhower would meet with Rogers and Nixon on February 8, giving both men a copy of his letter. Word of a secret "understanding" between Eisenhower and Nixon would leak, causing Eisenhower to release to the press key portions of the letter on March 3 (see Eisenhower to Dulles, Feb. 7, 1958; Ambrose, Nixon, vol. I, The Education of a Politician, 1913 - 1963, pp. 451 - 55; see also Public Papers of the Presidents: Eisenhower, 1958, pp. 188 - 89, 198; and New York Times, Mar. 1, 4, 1958).

4 Although President James Abram Garfield had been shot on July 2, 1881, he did not die until September 19 of that year. Thomas Woodrow Wilson, twenty-eighth President of the United States, suffered a stroke that had left him partially paralyzed in October 1919. The incapacitation of both men had raised serious constitutional questions concerning who should properly perform the functions of the presidency. See Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent, Ohio, 1978); Woodrow Wilson, The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, ed. Arthur S. Link, vols. 1 - 69 (Princeton, N.J., 1966 - 94), vol. 63, September 4 - November 5, 1919 (1990), pp. 542 - 646; August Heckscher, Woodrow Wilson (New York, 1991), pp. 611 - 44; and Robert H. Ferrell, Ill-Advised: Presidential Health and Public Trust (1992), pp. 11 - 20. See also Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 647 - 49.

5 A bipartisan effort to deal with this problem would not be successful during 1958. The Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution, regularizing procedures in the case of presidential disability, would not be ratified until 1967 (see New York Times, Mar. 5, 1958; see also Congressional Quarterly Almanac, vol. XIV, 1958, p. 77).

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Personal and secret To Richard Milhous Nixon, 5 February 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 566. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/566.cfm

 


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