<--PREV Doc #56  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #58 Document #57; March 5, 1957 Diary Series: EM, AWF, DDE Diaries Series The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVIII - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace Part I: A New Beginning, Old Problems; January 1957 to May 1957 Chapter 1: The Mideast and the Eisenhower Doctrine   Phoned Harold Macmillan (see note from Secretary Dulles dated 3/5/57).1 He expressed the belief that the matter (of the reduction of British forces in NATO) would not be finally determined by the British government until after the Bermuda meeting, but that he could not at this time reverse his position. The plan is to reduce the British force on the continent from 80,000 to 50,000 over a period of two years.2 Macmillan implied that Norstad had approved of this plan.3 1 Dulles had told Eisenhower that a "critical situation" had developed because of "British insistence on a sharp and early reduction of their NATO forces" to numbers far below the commitment they had made in 1954. Dulles had suggested that Eisenhower ask Prime Minister Macmillan to postpone a final decision until the two men could discuss the matter during their meetings in Bermuda (Dulles to Eisenhower, Mar. 5, 1957, AWF/I: Macmillan). On the Bermuda meetings, which would begin on March 21, see no. 78. 2 Eisenhower told Macmillan that such an announcement would give him problems "because the US participation in NATO is based on the so-called Fair Share formula, and there are people in this country--there is always a section here--that is totally against such participation, and always wants to cut down." Although Macmillan said that the troop reduction "was necessary because they were not solvent," he agreed not to "push the matter" (Telephone conversations, Eisenhower and Macmillan, and Eisenhower and Dulles, Mar. 5, 1957, AWF/D; see also State, Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXVII, Western Europe and Canada, pp. 694 - 96; on Britain's economic problems see Galambos and van Ee, The Middle Way, nos. 2106 and 2124A). 3 For background on General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe since November 1956, see Galambos and van Ee, The Middle Way, nos. 954 and 1832. According to Secretary Dulles, Norstad had indicated that in light of the magnitude of the reductions, he was not certain he could carry out his duties (Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, Feb. 5, 1957, AWF/D). Hoping to clear up any misapprehension, Macmillan cabled Eisenhower later on this same day. Claiming that he was "up against a rigid timetable," he said that he had to prepare both a defense white paper and the budget before leaving for Bermuda. Macmillan also noted that the British government had tried to address General Norstad's concerns by spreading out the reductions over a two-year period. "I earnestly hope," the Prime Minister concluded, "that in these circumstances it will be possible for the United States Government at least not to query our proposals. I am sure that this will make all the difference to our chances of getting a quick and satisfactory conclusion on which our whole economy depends" (AWF/I: Macmillan). For developments see no. 98. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Diary, 5 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 57. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/57.cfm <--PREV Doc #56  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #58

Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission 1629 K Street, NW Suite 801 Washington DC 20006 Phone: 202.296.0004    Fax: 202.296.6464