Presidential Papers, Doc#619 To Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, 22 March 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #619; March 22, 1958
To Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Bulganin

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part IV: Recession and Reform; February 1958 to May 1958
Chapter 8: "To engender confidence"

 

Dear Mr. Chairman:1 I have received your letter of March 3. In my view, the substantive points which you make with regard to a possible Summit meeting do not appear to differ from those contained in the Aide Memoire which Mr. Gromyko gave Ambassador Thompson on February 28.2 A full reply to the Aide Memoire has already been given to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington.3 We are now awaiting, therefore, the Soviet Government’s response in the hope that this response will facilitate progress toward resolution of the important problems to which I have drawn attention in my previous communications to you.4 In your letter you also make certain allegations with respect to American policy with which I cannot agree and on which I may wish to comment at a later date.5 Sincerely

1 State Department officials drafted this letter to the Soviet leader; it would not be sent, however, after receiving a subsequent Soviet aide-memoire (see n. 5; Dulles to Eisenhower, Mar. 21, 1958, AWF/I: Bulganin; and Dulles to Eisenhower, Apr. 3, 1958, AWF/D-H).

2 Bulganin had assured Eisenhower that the Soviet Union was willing to consider proposals recommended for discussion by other participating nations; those proposals, however, could not include the internal affairs of other states or the reunification of Germany (AWF/I: Bulganin). For the Soviet aide-memoire see no. 588.

3 The U.S. reply, delivered to Ambassador Mikhail A. Menshikov on March 6, acknowledged the willingness of the Soviet Union to have preliminary meetings of the foreign ministers but maintained that the summit meeting envisioned by the Soviets would not reduce international tension. The United States wanted a meeting that would resolve such political issues as the limitation of armaments and would create an atmosphere conducive to further settlements (State, American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1958, pp. 763 - 66).

4 See nos. 521 and 574.

5 Bulganin had criticized those in the United States who had called for a preventive war against the Soviet Union. Although he acknowledged that this was not the official policy of the United States, Bulganin told Eisenhower that the Soviet Union could not ignore these statements, especially since the U.S. government did not condemn them. Bulganin also objected to assertions that the Soviets were to blame for the failure to achieve nuclear disarmament.

On March 24 Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko would give Ambassador Thompson an aide-memoire, answering the U.S. note of March 6. The note, Dulles would later report, demanded "a very high political price" as a condition for a summit meeting. The Soviets had asked for the recognition of the East German government; the ending of the 1955 Geneva agreement to work toward the reunification of Germany; and the acceptance of an agenda based on premises the Western nations did not accept (Dulles to Eisenhower, Mar. 25, 1958, AWF/D-H; and State, American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1958, pp. 771 - 77). For developments see no. 628.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin, 22 March 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 619. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/619.cfm

 


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