<--PREV Doc #645  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #647 Document #646; April 9, 1958 Memorandum Series: EM, AWF, Ann Whitman Diary Series The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace Part IV: Recession and Reform; February 1958 to May 1958 Chapter 9: "The problems inherent in this job"   Subject: Okinawa. For some time the Secretary of State and I have been much concerned about our failure to make with the Japanese an acceptable and mutually agreeable arrangement for the Okinawa Base.1 The problem is rather simply stated. We will obviously have the need for the Base for some years. At the same time the natives on Okinawa are growing in number and are very anxious to repossess the land that they once owned. Regardless of legal or treaty arrangements, this conflict creates problems not only with our relationships with the people of Okinawa and Japan but could, if they become acute, be used for ammunition in the Communist propaganda attacks upon us. The situation could become unpleasant. While I do not expect the matter to assume the importance of the Cyprus difficulty with Britain, nor of the Algerian with France, still there could easily develop a situation that would create much embarrassment for us.2 We feel certain that in the cases of Cyprus and Algiers the local populations would have readily accept[ed] some five to six years ago privileges and rights that the respective mother countries would now gladly accord them. But the undercover struggles in these regions have for their purpose the expulsion of foreign troops from the area and so aroused emotions, misunderstandings and hatreds that nothing less than complete independence will seemingly satisfy the bulk of these populations. The lesson is that we should be forehanded with offers that the Okinawans will clearly recognize as generous and understanding and which will have the effect at least for some years of forestalling trouble. The Secretary of State informs me that he and the Defense Department are working actively on the problem. I personally hope that there will be an offer made of some division of territory so that there may be established an American enclave of minimum size to meet our needs.3 I would think that such a political agreement could be established together with reasonable financial remuneration. We might make of all these peoples firm allies rather than latent enemies.4 1 The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1952 had established U.S. policy toward Japan and the administration of the Ryukyu Islands (see Galambos and van Ee, The Middle Way, no. 457; see also Galambos, Chief of Staff, no. 1384 and p. 2293). Since December 1956 State and Defense Department officials had been discussing policy changes that would accommodate the mounting pressure for a return of the islands to Japanese authority without jeopardizing U.S. military bases in the area. After a thorough study of Administration policy toward the Ryukyus by the National Security Council, however, Eisenhower had issued an executive order (June 1957) continuing U.S. control over the administrative, legislative, and jurisdictional affairs of the islands. U.S. Ambassador to Japan Douglas MacArthur II had discussed the security treaty with Dulles. He had made specific recommendations for changes in U.S. policies toward Okinawa where, he said, time was "running swiftly and remorselessly" against the United States. In a meeting with the President on April 1 Dulles had suggested the idea of an enclave that the United States would control, with Japan administering the rest of the island. Eisenhower thought that the idea was "well worth exploring" (U.S. Department of State Bulletin 37, no. 941 [July 8, 1957], 51 - 58; State, Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XXIII, pt. 1, Japan, pp. 52 - 62, 197 - 201, 244 - 46, 281 - 82, 346 - 49, 359, 436 - 37, 513 - 16, 524 - 27; State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XVIII, Japan; Korea, pp. 4 - 21; and NSC meeting minutes, Oct. 18, 1958, AWF/NSC). 2 For background on the Cyprus situation see nos. 78 and 488; on Algeria see Galambos and van Ee, The Middle Way, nos. 1792 and 2108, and no. 451 in these volumes. 3 Before writing this memorandum, Eisenhower had asked Dulles about the progress toward developing a new policy regarding Okinawa. If something could be done quickly, the President said, relations with Japan and particularly with Prime Minister Kishi would be strengthened. Later this same day Dulles would tell Eisenhower that the U.S. High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands wanted permission to announce to the legislature that the United States was reviewing its policy regarding land acquisition. The President said: "Tell him to keep his damn mouth shut" (Telephone conversations, Eisenhower and Dulles, Apr. 9, 1958, AWF/D; see also Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversations). 4 After consultation with State Department officials and Ambassador MacArthur, Dulles would tell Eisenhower that "the moment was not opportune" to return control of Okinawa to the Japanese. The military installations were so scattered that limiting U.S. jurisdiction to one or two enclaves would not be possible, he said. The Defense Department should begin a program to "rearrange their affairs" on the island so that in three to five years Japan could regain control of most of the administrative responsibilities. Eisenhower thought that was "a sound approach" and asked Dulles to explain the situation to Defense Secretary McElroy (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XVIII, Japan; Korea, pp. 21 - 22; see also NSC meeting minutes, June 3, 1958, AWF/NSC). For developments see no. 724. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Memorandum, 9 April 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 646. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/646.cfm <--PREV Doc #645  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #647

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