Presidential Papers, Doc#72 Secret To Guy Mollet, 14 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #72; March 14, 1957
To Guy Mollet
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Mollet ; Category: Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XVIII - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part I: A New Beginning, Old Problems; January 1957 to May 1957
Chapter 1: The Mideast and the Eisenhower Doctrine

 

Dear Mr. President:1 I fully share the concern expressed in your letter, which I received through your Ambassador late March 13, regarding the situation between Israel and Egypt.2

I can assure you that I am making great efforts to the end that the objectives which we seek of peace and tranquility in the area will be achieved. We are in constant touch with both parties to the dispute, with the Secretary General, and with other friendly governments. Our purpose has been to avoid precipitate action by Egypt or by Israel which might result in a deterioration leading to a renewal of hostilities, thus undoing all that has been accomplished, with consequences of a most grave character.

We must realize, of course, that the current difficulty stems from problems of long standing which require the greatest patience and perseverance in their solution. I am sure you will agree that the Governments of both Israel and Egypt should be urged to exercise the utmost restraint.

The United States, along with other powers, stated in the United Nations its attitude regarding the international character of the Straits of Tiran, and expressed its view that United Nations forces should be deployed at Sharm el-Sheikh following the Israeli withdrawal. It endorsed the Secretary General's statement of February 28 regarding notice to the United Nations before the Emergency Force would be withdrawn from that area.3 Further, the United States set forth its views concerning United Nations functions in the Gaza Strip following Israeli withdrawal. I assume that the statement of our respective positions regarding these matters made in the UN Assembly is what you mean by our "accord commun."4 We continue to stand by these positions, although it is of course obvious that these matters are not for the United States alone to decide.

As you know, it is our belief that the arrangements for the administration of the Gaza Strip can only be within the legal framework brought about by the Armistice Agreement. While that Agreement gives Egypt certain rights with respect to Gaza, it is our expressed hope that Egypt will not exercise those rights but will permit the United Nations, pending some suitable agreement or settlement, to continue responsibilities in Gaza along the lines of the Secretary General's report of February 22.5 If, notwithstanding our efforts to achieve this in its entirety, Egypt should exercise its legal rights and insist upon a return to Gaza of some Egyptian personnel, we would not feel that would create a situation in which Israel would be justified in taking military action. We made our attitude on this latter point clear to Israeli officials prior to the Israeli decision to withdraw behind the Armistice lines. It is our position, however, that if there should be any recurrence of hostilities or violation by either party of its international obligations, including those of the Armistice Agreement, a situation would be created for United Nations consideration. The United States would consult with other members of the United Nations to consider appropriate action which they or the United Nations might take.

In view of the seriousness of this matter our two Governments should, of course, continue close consultation as the situation develops.6 Sincerely yours

1 A past president of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party, Mollet had been President of the French Republic since February 1956 (see Galambos and van Ee, The Middle Way, no. 2123). Eisenhower approved and signed the State Department draft of this message, which we have used as our source text. The State Department cabled the text of this letter to the American embassy in Paris on this same day (AWF/I: Mollet).

2 For background on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh see no. 56. Fearing that the civilian situation in the Gaza Strip had become dangerous, Egyptian President Nasser had appointed an administrative governor and staff to oversee conditions in the area. Israel believed that Egypt intended to reoccupy the territory and had urged the United States to intervene. In his letter Mollet told Eisenhower that if the Egyptian attitude did not change, Israel would be justified in redeploying its forces. "In this eventuality, [the] effort which we have achieved in common would prove to be [in] vain and [the] situation [in the] Middle East would be gravely compromised" (AWF/I: Mollet; State, Foreign Relations, 1955 - 1957, vol. XVII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1957, pp. 396 - 406, 415 - 16).

3 We have been unable to locate a statement regarding this issue made by Hammarskjöld on February 28. Two days earlier, however, he had assured the Israeli government in writing that any proposal to remove United Nations troops from the area would first come before the General Assembly (ibid., p. 314; see also New York Times, Feb. 27, 1957).

4 "We are ready, on our part," Mollet had said, "to urge moderation and patience on Israel if the situation evolves within the framework of our common accord."

5 According to Secretary General Hammarskjöld, Egypt desired a safe and orderly takeover of the Gaza Strip by the U.N. forces and would work with the United Nations in assisting the Arab refugees. Egypt would also cooperate in ending all incursions and raids across the border from either side (U.S. Department of State Bulletin 36, no. 927 [April 1, 1957], 544).

6 Charles Woodruff Yost, Minister-Counselor of the U.S. embassy, personally delivered this message to Mollet on the following day. Although the French President told Yost that he "would counsel restraint and prudence upon [the] Israelis to the best of his ability," he said that he was shocked by Egyptian President Nasser's dictatorial moves (Yost to Dulles, Mar. 15, 1957, AWF/I: Mollet). For developments see no. 74.

 

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Secret To Guy Mollet, 14 March 1957. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 72. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/72.cfm

 


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