Presidential Papers, Doc#761 To Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, 2 July 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #761; July 2, 1958
To Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Khrushchev

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part V: Forcing the President's Hand; June 1958 to October 1958
Chapter 12: America Invades the Mideast

 

Dear Mr. Chairman: I was frankly surprised by your letter of June eleventh. You complain about delay in preparations for a Summit meeting precisely at the moment when the Western powers have submitted a proposal for a serious and effective procedure for conducting these preparations. This refutes the allegation contained in your letter that the three Western powers are creating obstacles and impeding progress toward a Summit meeting.1

The position of the Western powers concerning holding of a meeting of Heads of Governments has been clear from the outset. They consider such a meeting desirable if it would provide an opportunity for conducting serious discussions of major problems and would be an effective means of reaching agreement on significant subjects. From the known positions of the Soviet Government, there is no evidence so far that such is the case. That is why the Western powers insist on adequate preparatory work and why they have put forward their proposal to facilitate satisfactory completion of this work.

The Soviet Government instead has disrupted the discussions in Moscow by taking upon itself to publish with bare hours of warning and no attempt at consultation the documents exchanged between it and the Western powers, including diplomatic documents originating from the Western powers. This action is scarcely consonant with the spirit of serious preparation in which the Western powers entered into these diplomatic exchanges. It cannot but cast doubt on the intentions of the Soviet Government concerning the proper preparations for a Summit meeting.2

Following receipt of the Soviet agenda proposals on May fifth the three Ambassadors in interviews on May twenty-eighth, thirty-first, and June second presented in return the Western agenda proposals. They also outlined to Mr. Gromyko a suggested procedure for overcoming the difficulty caused by the fact that the two sets of proposals were widely divergent. The Western Ambassadors are quite ready to offer comments on the Soviet agenda proposals and to clarify certain points in their own proposals on which the Soviet Government seems to have misconceptions. But the Western Governments cannot agree that the discussions between their Ambassadors and Mr. Gromyko should be based exclusively on the Soviet list any more than they would expect the Soviet Government to agree to base the discussions solely on the Western list. Since the topics in both lists fall under certain general headings, the Western proposal was that preparatory discussion of the individual topics put forward by the two sides should take place within the framework of these general headings. Had this been accepted by the Soviet Government, the Soviet Foreign Minister and the Ambassadors could have proceeded to examine the positions of the various governments on the topics in both lists and establish what subjects should be submitted for examination by the Heads of Government. Neither side would, during the preparatory stage, have been able to veto the inclusion of any topic for discussion and an opportunity would have been afforded to find some common ground, for later consideration by Heads of Government.

Mr. Gromyko promised an official reply to the above proposal. Instead, however, the Soviet Government has now addressed communications to the Heads of Government of the three Western powers, in the form of your letters of June eleventh, which repeat the arguments in favor of the Soviet set of proposals of May fifth and criticize some of the Western proposals which it happens not to like. The procedural proposal put forward by the Ambassadors has been ignored altogether.

You allege in your letters that the Western powers by including, as possible subjects of discussion at a meeting of Heads of Government, some of the great political issues that create grave tension are trying to prevent the holding of a Summit meeting.3 There is no warrant for this allegation. A meeting of Heads of Government would not respond to the hopes and aspirations of mankind if they met under an injunction that seals their lips so that they could not even mention the great political issues that gravely trouble their relations and endanger world peace.

In spite of the arbitrary action of the Soviet Government and its apparent unwillingness to negotiate seriously on concrete points at issue, the Western powers do not propose to abandon hope or to relax their efforts to seek solutions of the major outstanding problems. If the Soviet Government is equally serious in pursuing this goal, it will accept the procedural proposal put forward by the Western powers or advance some equally effective and workable alternative.4 Sincerely

1 For background see no. 754. On May 28 the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France had given Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko a draft agenda of questions to be considered at a summit conference. Among the items included were the control of fissionable material production and the reduction of existing stockpiles of such materials, the suspension of nuclear tests, the use of outer space for peaceful purposes, the reunification of Germany, and European security arrangements (State, American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1958, pp. 802 - 9). In his letter Khrushchev had objected to the inclusion of German reunification. "We have already repeatedly stated that we regard it inadmissable to raise such a question at an international conference," he wrote. "The Soviet Union does not intend to interfere in the international affairs of other sovereign states and is of the opinion that no one can claim the right to such interference" (Khrushchev to Eisenhower, June 11, 1958, AWF/I: Khrushchev).

2 These documents are in State, American Foreign Policy; Current Documents, 1958, pp. 787 - 88, 780 - 800, 802 - 9.

3 The Soviet leader appeared to doubt that the Western powers really wanted a summit meeting. They had chosen agenda items that were not "ripe" for settlement, Khrushchev said, so that they could later claim to have predicted the failure of the conference (Khrushchev to Eisenhower, June 11, 1958, AWF/I: Khrushchev).

4 For developments see no. 783.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. To Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev, 2 July 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 761. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/761.cfm

 


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