Presidential Papers, Doc#776 Draft cable. Secret To Harold Macmillan, 18 July 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower

Document #776; July 18, 1958
To Harold Macmillan
Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Macmillan ; Category: Draft cable. Secret

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace
Part V: Forcing the President's Hand; June 1958 to October 1958
Chapter 12: America Invades the Mideast

 

Dear Harold:1 Your cable of July 18 has just now reached me. Foster and Selwyn have had useful talks and I believe that our thinking on the common problem is identical. Our operations seem to be satisfactorily co-ordinated.2

One factor that has helped create for us the serious Mid East problem has been the Western failure to counteract or effectively neutralize the Nasser propaganda in that region.3 For ourselves we have long seen the danger growing out of this failure and felt we knew what material means we needed to wage an effective campaign. But the Congress has never seen eye to eye with us on this point. So we have lacked facilities, to say nothing of the needed technicians and local cooperation and cover.4

We know that Nasser has won the enthusiastic and even idolatrous support of the largely illiterate populations in the region. One reason has been his use of the slogan of nationalism, which is one force stronger than communism.5 We have failed to attract the spirit of nationalism to the support of Western ideals, while he has inspired it to support the concept of a Pan-Arab State. As a result, the government of other Mid East countries, in most cases based on feudalist traditions rather than on any popular sentiment, have been living in a precarious situation.6

While this subject could be enlarged upon both in its history and in its clamor for future attention, it is enough to say for the moment that I think we must concert our propaganda efforts not only in the countries already disaffected, but even more so in those regions which are still loyal to the West--or at least neutral. Libya, Sudan and Ethiopia need help.7

Naturally, no matter what we do in the field of information, education and propaganda, in nearly all cases we must also help friendly governments economically, militarily and politically.

We must try to bolster up both the loyalties and the military strength of Lebanon and Jordan.

Probably even more important is the area of the Persian Gulf. It seems to me that in this region we should exert ourselves on a very broad front--by this I mean political, propaganda, economic and military--to make sure of its retention in the Western orbit.

In a very definite sense Turkey and Iran have become key regions in the defense of the Mid East. We should bestir ourselves to see that they are sturdy allies, first in quality and second in quantity--insofar as that quantity can be provided and maintained.

Pakistan is important but the fears of India compel some caution in the extent of help to be given.

There is much to do and our resolution must measure up to the difficulty of the task. Moreover, the true source of our strength is the thoroughness of the understanding of our own people of these intricate problems. Democracies exert a tremendous power for accomplishment when there exists an overwhelming and favorable public opinion. An informed public opinion requires mass understanding. The evidence that our understanding is not all that it should be is found in the reluctance of Congress to appropriate money for information programs and mutual security costs, and economic improvement of less developed nations.

There is no question in my mind of the need for success in creating an informed public opinion here, and possibly in your country. If we can do this well it will spread throughout the whole Western world. If a vast majority of both our peoples stand four-square and sturdily behind the great effort to preserve the Mid East we need not fear either the dictators in the Kremlin or a puppet in Cairo.8

In the meantime, together, we have to keep plugging along with such wisdom as the Lord gives us to bring about a more prosperous and peaceful world.9

With warm regard, As ever

1 Eisenhower had dictated and edited this message draft, which after substantial editing was sent to London for Prime Minister Macmillan. According to a notation by Ann Whitman, the draft was kept as a "matter of record" since it was "so much more to the point the President was making than the final one that the State Department submitted and that was sent." At the bottom of a copy of Eisenhower's cover letter, which told Secretary Dulles to send the message if he were to "agree with it," Whitman had written, "State re-wrote[.] Bah!" (Eisenhower to Dulles, July 18, 1958, AWF/D-H). Two earlier drafts of this message with Eisenhower's handwritten emendations are in AWF/D; the final, State-drafted version, which Eisenhower approved, is in AWF/I: Macmillan. For background on the landing of U.S. troops in Lebanon see no. 770.

2 The State Department's version of the cable would include a reference to British troop landings in Jordan at the end of this paragraph: "I recognize that your decision as regards Jordan was a very close and difficult one. We have of course fully supported your decision." Macmillan had cabled the President regarding his decision to send two battalions of paratroops into Jordan after King Hussein had requested British aid to protect his country’s independence. He had wanted to defer the decision until after Foreign Secretary Lloyd and Secretary Dulles had concluded their Washington meetings. "Clearly this is a situation in which we ought ideally to have had a proper joint long-term plan before embarking on any operations." Macmillan also said that he "very much" disliked "from the military point of view, the sort of operation to which we are now committed in Jordan where our own troops will have no port, no heavy arms and no real mobility" (Macmillan to Eisenhower, July 18, 1958, PREM/11 2380; see also Macmillan to Eisenhower, July 16, 1958, AWF/I: Macmillan; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 513 - 20; Eisenhower, Waging Peace, pp. 278 - 80; Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955 - 1967 [New York, 1989], pp. 88 - 90; and State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. XI, Lebanon and Jordan, pp. 308 - 22). On the Dulles-Lloyd talks see Memorandum of Conversation, July 17, 1958, AWF/I: Macmillan; and Hood to Macmillan, July 17, 1958, PREM/11 2380.

Eisenhower had told Dulles that Macmillan's message "seemed to imply a loss of spirit" and that the letter he had drafted was an attempt "to buck him up a little . . . in the guise of making a review of the problem" (Telephone conversation, Eisenhower and Dulles, July 18, 1958, AWF/D).

3 For background on Egyptian President Nasser's impact on Middle Eastern affairs see no. 450.

4 This sentence was omitted from the final version of the cable.

5 Eisenhower's statement that nationalism was a stronger force than communism was not used; the outgoing message referred to regions "where more emphasis can be put upon nationalism which, in fact, Soviet Communism tries to destroy."

6 The State Department removed this sentence from the cable.

7 The specific references to Libya, Sudan, and Ethiopia were omitted from the final version of Eisenhower's message.

8 The State Department condensed the two preceding paragraphs into one:

Of course, the foundation for all that we do is understanding here at home. I am struggling hard these days to overcome the reluctance of Congress to appropriate money for information programs and mutual security costs and the economic development of the less developed nations.

9 The reference to "plugging along" was dropped from the outgoing cable. The State Department also inserted the following language:

The problems are immense and we are not free of danger. We can, I think, however, recognize that the danger is not here because of what we have done. What we have done has made apparent and overt a danger that was always there.

For developments see no. 785.

Bibliographic reference to this document:
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Draft cable. Secret To Harold Macmillan, 18 July 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 776. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/776.cfm

 


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