<--PREV Doc #777  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #779 Document #778; July 19, 1958 To Harold Macmillan Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Mid East ; Category: Cable. Secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace Part V: Forcing the President's Hand; June 1958 to October 1958 Chapter 12: America Invades the Mideast   Dear Harold: I have your message of July 10, regarding our discussion, when you were in Washington, of the level of British forces in Germany.1 I am in agreement with your suggestion that our two representatives on the NATO Council should be authorized to discuss the problem of the financial gap and to see whether a solution to the problem can be found. Accordingly, Foster is sending appropriate instructions to Ambassador Burgess, asking him to concert with Sir Frank Roberts.2 Naturally I would wish any such discussions to be without prejudice to the basic question we discussed when you were here. If it should develop that no way can be found within NATO to bridge the financial gap, I would still very much hope that you and your colleagues would find it possible to reconsider your decision to reduce the level of British forces in Germany.3 With warm regard, As ever 1 For background on British force levels see no. 57. At the time of the Washington discussions (June 9 - 11), Macmillan had agreed to maintain the current level of British troops in Germany in 1959 if NATO would bridge the financial gap between the current 55,000 and the proposal to economize by cutting the British force to 45,000. Eisenhower had asked Macmillan to reconsider the decision even if no financial aid was available. Macmillan said that he would make no decision before talking with General Norstad (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. VII, pt. 2, Western Europe, pp. 817 - 18; and State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. VII, pt. 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada, pp. 327 - 28; see also Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 246 - 48, 501). In his letter to the President Macmillan had acknowledged the political importance of the British force and his reluctance to cause dissension within the alliance. He told Eisenhower that he would defer the decision until October 1 to allow time for further negotiations. Nevertheless, he said, the ultimate goal was 45,000 regular British troops-- "a very powerful force" (Macmillan to Eisenhower, July 10, 1958, PREM/11 2325 and AWF/I: Macmillan). 2 W. Randolph Burgess was the chief of the U.S. mission to NATO; Frank Kenyon Roberts, career diplomat and former British Ambassador to Yugoslavia, was the British permanent representative. 3 After subsequent negotiations the United States would agree to provide $25 million to the United Kingdom for their mutual weapons development program, thus permitting the British to announce in mid-October that they would maintain their current force levels through 1959 (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. VII, pt. 1, Western European Integration and Security; Canada, p. 348; see also Foreign Office to Roberts, July 10, 1958, PREM/11 2325). Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Secret To Harold Macmillan, 19 July 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 778. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/778.cfm <--PREV Doc #777  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #779

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