<--PREV Doc #911  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #913 Document #912; October 31, 1958 To Harold Macmillan Series: EM, AWF, International Series: Macmillan ; Category: Cable. Secret The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, Volume XIX - The Presidency: Keeping the Peace Part V: Forcing the President's Hand; June 1958 to October 1958 Chapter 13: Quemoy and Matsu   Dear Harold: Thank you for your message of October twenty-seventh about the setback to the effort to get a conference about Cyprus under way.1 I can readily understand your disappointment at the sudden decision of the Greek Government not to participate in a conference, especially in light of the long and painstaking discussions in the North Atlantic Council and the considerable efforts at compromise which your Government has made in the course of these discussions. We too were greatly disappointed by the Greek Government’s decision, and we have made our disappointment known to the Greeks.2 We share your belief that there is probably little advantage to be gained in pressing the Greeks further at this time to attend a conference, and we also share your hope that a conference may yet be possible. In spite of our disappointment with the Greeks, we believe that it is very important to keep open the door to further NATO talks on Cyprus. To this end we hope that it will be possible to avoid any action by NATO which could create the impression that NATO is opposed to Greece on this issue. Within recent weeks, we have noticed a healthier and less suspicious attitude on the part of the Greek Government toward the idea of NATO consultation with regard to Cyprus. This new attitude should, in our opinion, be encouraged, since it holds forth the possibility of eventual further productive talks under the aegis of NATO.3 I admire your refusal to be disheartened by recent Cyprus developments and your determination to continue to work toward a settlement of this vastly difficult problem. For our part, we always shall be ready to help whenever and however we appropriately can.4 With warm regard, As ever 1 For background on the Cyprus situation see no. 872. At the October 6 meeting of the North Atlantic Council the British and Turkish representatives had agreed to confer on the issue. The Greek representative had announced that his country would participate if the agenda included the determination of the final status of Cyprus. Council members then decided, subject to the approval of their governments, to sponsor a conference attended by representatives of the three governments and at least one other NATO power as a neutral observer. After a close vote, however, the Greek cabinet had rejected the proposal (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. X, pt. 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, pp. 719 - 33; see also Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Cyprus Question, pp. 12 - 35). Macmillan had told Eisenhower that the Greeks had been "very weak" about Cyprus and were influenced by the opposition of Archbishop Makarios to the conference. The British felt that "the right course was to let the Greeks simmer for a period. In their hearts," he said, "most of the Greek Government realizes that their attitude is indefensible; if we run after them now it will only consolidate them; but if we do nothing, their self-doubting will take effect" (AWF/I: Macmillan; see also Dulles to Eisenhower, Oct. 30, 1958, AWF/D-H; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, pp. 687 - 88; and Reddaway, Burdened with Cyprus, pp. 114 - 19). 2 Assistant Secretary of State William Rountree had expressed the attitude of the United States to the Greek ambassador in a meeting four days earlier (State, Foreign Relations, 1958 - 1960, vol. X, pt. 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, p. 734). 3 Greek government officials had told the American ambassador in Athens that the Greek attitude toward NATO was much improved in recent weeks. They hoped that the United States would use its influence to prevent the NATO communiqué from blaming Greece for the breakdown of negotiations (ibid., pp. 731 - 32). 4 For developments see no. 1054. Bibliographic reference to this document: Eisenhower, Dwight D. Cable. Secret To Harold Macmillan, 31 October 1958. In The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, ed. L. Galambos and D. van Ee, doc. 912. World Wide Web facsimile by The Dwight D. Eisenhower Memorial Commission of the print edition; Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/second-term/documents/912.cfm <--PREV Doc #911  |  Memorial Commission Home Page  |  Second Term Table of Contents  |  Presidential Papers Home Page  |  Doc#  |  NEXT--> Doc #913

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